Subhas Chandra Bose: Beyond Icons, Beyond Appropriation

 

 

Subhas Chandra Bose: Beyond Icons, Beyond Appropriation

Subhas Chandra Bose remains one of the most powerful and complex figures of Indias freedom struggle. He is often reduced to slogans, military uniforms and dramatic images of armed resistance. Yet Bose was far more than a rebel commander or a romantic nationalist. He was a deeply intellectual political thinker, a disciplined organiser, a spiritual seeker and a nationalist who believed that freedom was not only about ending colonial rule but also about building a socially just nation.

Bose was shaped by both Indian spiritual traditions and Western political thought. He was influenced by Vedanta, the Bhagavad Gita, Sri Ramakrishna and Swami Vivekananda. From them he drew the idea of self sacrifice and fearless action. At the same time he was influenced by European socialism and anti imperial movements. This blend made him unique. He did not see spirituality and politics as separate worlds. For him inner discipline was necessary for public courage.

Politically Bose was a radical nationalist who believed that constitutional methods and slow negotiations would not be enough to break the British empire. While he respected Mahatma Gandhi deeply and always addressed him as the Father of the Nation, he fundamentally disagreed with the idea that nonviolence alone could defeat an armed colonial power. Bose believed that Britain’s global crisis during the Second World War created a historic opening that should not be wasted.

This ideological difference became politically visible in 1939 when Bose, as Congress President, contested and won the election against Pattabhi Sitaramayya, the candidate preferred by Gandhis circle. After the result, Gandhi remarked that Pattabhi’s defeat was his own defeat. This statement is often misused today to suggest personal hostility toward Bose. In reality, Gandhi was acknowledging that his political line had been rejected by the party, not that Bose lacked legitimacy as a nationalist. The conflict that followed was not about patriotism but about strategy, timing and leadership style.

Gandhi and the senior Congress leadership believed that organisational unity and mass nonviolent mobilisation were more important than radical confrontation. Bose believed delay would only strengthen colonial control. When Bose found that the Congress Working Committee would not cooperate with his agenda, he resigned from the presidency. Yet even after this rupture, neither side treated the other as an enemy. Bose continued to publicly revere Gandhi, and when he later formed the Indian National Army, he named one of its brigades the Gandhi Brigade, another the Nehru Brigade and another the Azad Brigade. This symbolic act shows that Bose saw the freedom struggle as a collective national project even when methods differed.

Boses relationship with religion is also frequently distorted in present narratives. He was personally religious and spiritually inclined but politically secular. He believed religion should build moral strength, not political identity. That is why he opposed both Hindu Mahasabha and Muslim League for injecting communal identity into nationalist politics. As Congress President he supported banning dual membership of Congress with communal organisations. For Bose, communal politics weakened the fight against colonialism and strengthened British divide and rule.

This also explains why claims of ideological proximity between Bose and organisations like the RSS do not withstand historical scrutiny. There is an anecdote that after resigning from Congress leadership, Bose explored contact with several groups and sent an emissary to seek a meeting with Hedgewar. The meeting did not take place. More importantly, RSS at that time followed a strategy of organisational consolidation without direct confrontation with British authority, while Bose was moving toward open confrontation and armed struggle. Strategically and ideologically they were on different paths.

Boses decision to seek foreign assistance during the Second World War remains controversial. He believed that an imperial power at war could be defeated only by force and that global conflict created an opportunity for colonial liberation. His alliance with Axis powers was tactical, not ideological. He did not endorse fascism as a political model for India. His vision for post independence India was socialist and democratic. Yet this path carried grave moral and political risks, which historians must honestly acknowledge even while recognising the desperation of a colonised people seeking freedom by any available means.

One of the most progressive aspects of Boses leadership was his approach to social equality. In the INA he promoted women into combat roles through the Rani of Jhansi Regiment, an extraordinary step for that era. He rejected caste distinctions and regional hierarchies within the army. His speeches repeatedly stressed that political freedom must be followed by economic justice, land reform and social dignity. For Bose, nationalism was incomplete without social transformation.

After independence, the mystery surrounding his death and the later surveillance of his family added political controversy to his legacy. Declassified files show that intelligence agencies monitored the Bose family for years. But these documents do not establish that any Prime Minister personally ordered such surveillance. The continuation of colonial intelligence structures into independent India produced institutional suspicion that cannot be reduced to individual motives. Unfortunately, this complex history is now simplified into personality driven blame narratives.

In contemporary politics Bose is often appropriated selectively. His militarism is highlighted, while his socialism and secularism are ignored. His criticism of communal politics is rarely mentioned. His respect for other national leaders is erased to construct artificial rivalries. This selective remembrance does not honour Bose. It reduces him to a political tool.

True respect for Bose lies in recognising his full complexity. He was courageous but not reckless. Radical but not sectarian. Spiritual but not communal. Disciplined but not authoritarian. He represents a nationalist tradition that was intellectually serious, socially conscious and ethically driven.

Bose ultimately forces us to confront an uncomfortable truth. Freedom struggles are not uniform. They contain disagreements, debates and competing strategies. Patriotism does not require uniform thinking. Dissent within a national movement is not betrayal but part of democratic political evolution.

In an age when history is increasingly converted into ideological ammunition, Bose remains difficult to appropriate completely. He does not fit neatly into present political categories. Perhaps that is his greatest relevance today. He reminds us that nationalism without justice becomes hollow, and spirituality without humanity becomes dangerous.

Subhas Chandra Bose does not belong to any party or ideology. He belongs to history, and history demands honesty more than hero worship.

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Author Introduction

Siddhartha Shankar Mishra is an advocate at the Supreme Court of India and a commentator on law, politics and society. His writings blend legal insight with social critique and aim to provoke reflection on power, justice and public conscience.

Educated, Enraged and Engineered: How Digital Politics Is Rewriting Our Minds and Our Laws

 

Educated, Enraged and Engineered: How Digital Politics Is Rewriting Our Minds and Our Laws

The Education Paradox in the Age of Smartphones

India once believed that education would gradually dissolve prejudice and expand moral imagination. The smartphone age has exposed a troubling paradox. The educated middle class today appears more vulnerable to online communal narratives than the poor who struggle daily for survival. This vulnerability is not accidental. It is psychological, social and carefully cultivated by political communication strategies that understand insecurity better than ideology.

Fear of Falling and the Search for Enemies

The poor remain trapped in the politics of material life. Their anger is directed at prices, wages, healthcare and housing. Their grievances are immediate and visible. The middle class, however, lives in a permanent fear of falling. Employment feels uncertain. Social status feels fragile. Cultural confidence feels threatened. In such an atmosphere, symbolic enemies become easier targets than complex economic structures. Communal identity offers emotional relief by converting anxiety into belonging and grievance into moral superiority.

Echo Chambers of Respectable Prejudice

Social media platforms intensify this psychology. Housing societies, professional groups and alumni networks become ideological echo chambers where opinions are rewarded with approval and aggression is mistaken for courage. Over time, political signalling becomes a social requirement. Silence begins to look suspicious. Nuance appears weak. Extremes become normal.

Degrees Without Critical Training

Education in India has largely remained technical rather than philosophical. It trains people to perform tasks but rarely to question narratives or examine emotional manipulation. This creates a class that is confident in vocabulary but fragile in judgement. Polished propaganda dressed as historical fact and strategic realism circulates easily among people who feel informed but are rarely challenged to reflect on their own assumptions.

Why the Poor Remain Outside Digital Culture Wars

The poor, lacking constant access to ideological performance spaces, remain less invested in symbolic wars. Their anger is local and personal. The middle class anger becomes abstract and ideological, easily redirected toward distant communities and imagined threats. Political campaigns understand this difference well. They offer civilisational pride instead of policy answers, emotional unity instead of economic accountability. In doing so, they transform social anxiety into ideological mobilisation.

Algorithms That Reward Anger Over Accuracy

Misinformation thrives because digital platforms are not designed to reward truth. They are designed to reward engagement. Fear and anger generate more clicks than calm explanation. A lie can be dramatic, simple and emotionally satisfying. A correction must be cautious, complex and patient. In a culture trained to scroll, outrage always wins.

Custom Made Realities and Manufactured Loyalty

Algorithms amplify what keeps users emotionally involved. Once a person interacts with sensational content, similar narratives are pushed repeatedly. Gradually, people are surrounded by confirming messages. Reality becomes customised. Dissent appears dangerous. Skepticism looks like betrayal.

Belonging Becomes More Important Than Being Right

Political actors exploit this architecture deliberately. Instead of debating governance, they circulate identity driven stories that activate instinctive loyalty. Even when these stories are later disproved, the emotional impression remains. People remember how the message made them feel, not whether it was accurate. Sharing such content brings social approval. Correcting it brings hostility. Over time, truth becomes socially expensive.

From Digital Rage to Institutional Pressure

This cycle of outrage does not remain limited to screens. It enters police stations, courtrooms and legislative discourse. Law in a constitutional democracy is meant to operate through evidence, procedure and restraint. But institutions are staffed by human beings who exist within political and social climates.

Policing for Visibility Not Justice

Policing becomes reactive to publicity. High profile cases receive swift action while quieter injustices remain ignored. Arrests begin to serve symbolic reassurance rather than investigative necessity. Due process starts appearing as delay. Caution is interpreted as complicity.

Courts Under the Shadow of Popular Expectation

Courts, although constitutionally independent, do not function in social isolation. Judges read newspapers and face public discourse. When verdicts are expected to satisfy ideological camps, neutrality itself becomes controversial. Judicial reasoning is evaluated through political lenses rather than legal coherence.

The Slow Erosion of Constitutional Culture

This weakens constitutional culture. Rights exist to protect unpopular individuals and minorities. But when public emotion becomes the primary measure of justice, safeguards begin to look like obstacles. Law risks becoming a reflection of crowd morality instead of a restraint upon it.

Resistance Begins in the Mind

In such an environment, the survival of democracy depends not only on institutions but also on citizens who resist psychological manipulation. Mental independence becomes civic duty.

Slow Down the Emotional Reflex

The first form of resistance is slowing down emotional reaction. Anger is the preferred currency of digital platforms. Pausing before sharing or responding disrupts the cycle of impulsive amplification.

Break the Bubble of Confirmation

The second is diversifying information sources. Reading across ideological boundaries weakens the illusion that one narrative represents absolute truth. Exposure to complexity reduces susceptibility to propaganda.

Do Not Turn Ideology Into Identity

The third is separating personal identity from political slogans. When ideology becomes self worth, disagreement feels like personal attack. This emotional fusion makes manipulation easy and reconciliation impossible.

Save Relationships to Save Society

Preserving friendships and family relationships across political differences is not weakness. It is democratic resilience. When every disagreement becomes ideological warfare, society loses its capacity for empathy and dialogue.

Humility as Democratic Strength

Finally, resisting polarisation requires humility. Accepting the possibility of being wrong weakens propaganda which thrives on absolute certainty. Doubt is not betrayal. It is democratic maturity.

The Real Battle of Our Time

The real conflict of our time is not between religions or parties. It is between reflection and reaction, between thought and impulse, between citizenship and digital herding. Digital technology did not invent prejudice, but it has industrialised it. And when prejudice becomes profitable, politics stops seeking solutions and starts manufacturing enemies.

Democracy survives not only through elections and courts, but through citizens who refuse to surrender their minds to emotional automation. Algorithms may control screens, but they do not have to control conscience. That choice still remains with us.

Author Introduction

Siddhartha Shankar Mishra is an advocate at the Supreme Court of India and a commentator on law, politics and society. His writings blend legal insight with social critique and aim to provoke reflection on power, justice and public conscience.

Gods, Demons, and the Great Indian Confusion: Dharma versus Communalism

 

Gods, Demons, and the Great Indian Confusion: Dharma versus Communalism

The Old Game of Wordplay

India, land of a thousand tongues and a million gods, has always had a way with words. We turn mantras into missiles, slogans into scripture, and sometimes, deliberately, confusion into policy. One such confusion that festers in our public life today is the blurring of two utterly different ideas: Dharma and communalism. One is the timeless rhythm of existence, the other a toxic by-product of politics. But, as with so many things in modern India, the counterfeit is often peddled as the real.

Dharma: A Symphony, Not a Slogan

In Sanskrit, Dharma comes from dhri, to sustain. It is what keeps the universe upright when everything else tilts. It is not a sect, not a ritual, not even a religion in the narrow Western sense, but the music that holds life together—truth, justice, compassion, duty. The Rig Veda whispered millennia ago: Ekam sat vipra bahudha vadanti—Truth is one, the sages call it by many names.

Swami Vivekananda, who had little patience for hollow piety, thundered: “They alone live who live for others, the rest are more dead than alive.” His vision of Dharma was expansive, a river into which many tributaries could flow. Osho, the iconoclast, went further. “Whenever religion becomes organized, it loses the fragrance of truth,” he said. For him, Dharma was not an institution but an inner search: “Truth is not outside to be discovered, it is inside to be realized.” Between Vivekananda’s trumpet-call to service and Osho’s meditation on self-realization, we glimpse Dharma as it truly is—elastic, inclusive, liberating.

Communalism: The Counterfeit Coin

Now contrast this with communalism. Communalism is not faith but its counterfeit coin. It parades as religiosity but is minted in the furnaces of fear and suspicion. It is the belief that one community’s triumph depends on another’s humiliation, that the temple cannot stand unless the mosque falls, that purity can only be found in exclusion.

It is worth remembering that communalism in India was not born in the temple courtyard but in the counting house of politics. The British perfected it as divide and rule; post-independence politicians have refined it as divide and win elections. From the blood of Partition to the rumour-factories of WhatsApp, communalism is a story written in headlines and hashtags, more about power than prayer.

When Dharma Builds Bridges and Communalism Builds Walls

The difference is almost childishly simple. When a gurudwara opens its langar to all, that is Dharma. When a cow is lynched in the name of religion, that is communalism. When a church tends to the sick without asking their faith, that is Dharma. When mobs burn that same church, that is communalism. Dharma integrates, communalism dismembers. Yet the counterfeit is now pushed so aggressively that many mistake the poison for the cure.

The Politics of Confusion

This deliberate confusion is the masterstroke of our age. To question communalism is to be told you are questioning faith. To demand equality is to be accused of insulting tradition. To resist bigotry is to be branded anti-national. As Osho foresaw, “Religion becomes a shield for violence, politics uses it as a mask.” We live precisely in that masquerade.

The RSS-BJP ecosystem has perfected this sleight of hand. Dharma is reduced to a costume for power; communalism is dressed up as cultural pride. Loudspeakers blare not devotion but domination. Hashtags are hurled like stones. Every dissenting voice is painted as a traitor, every minority citizen as a threat. It is a theatre where the sacred is sacrificed daily on the altar of propaganda.

Vivekananda’s Warning in the Age of Trolls

Vivekananda, who once dazzled Chicago with his plea for universal tolerance, saw this danger long before Twitter was invented. “Sectarianism, bigotry, and its horrible descendant, fanaticism, have long possessed this beautiful earth. They have filled the earth with violence… had it not been for these horrible demons, human society would be far more advanced than it is now.” One can only imagine what he would have said of today’s troll armies, spewing venom under the guise of defending faith.

The Existential Choice Before India

For India, the most diverse democracy on earth, the distinction between Dharma and communalism is not academic—it is existential. If we live by Dharma, we preserve pluralism, we defend tolerance, we nourish our democracy. If we descend into communalism, we barter away all three for a handful of electoral slogans.

The irony is that those who claim to “protect” religion are often its greatest vandals. They confuse decibel levels with piety, mobs with morality, spectacle with spirituality. True Dharma does not need slogans. It is quiet, like the hand that feeds the hungry. It is intimate, like the prayer whispered without cameras. It is eternal, like the truth that survives long after propaganda collapses.

Conclusion: Choosing the Real Over the Counterfeit

The task before us is both simple and difficult. We must learn, again, to separate the eternal from the ephemeral, the genuine from the counterfeit. Dharma is eternal, communalism is transient. Dharma liberates, communalism enslaves. Dharma sustains, communalism corrodes.

In reclaiming Dharma we are not defending one religion against another; we are defending humanity against its own worst instincts. India’s future—indeed, the future of all plural societies—depends on choosing the real over the counterfeit, the symphony over the slogan, the bridge over the wall.

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Author’s Note
Siddhartha Shankar Mishra is an Advocate at the Supreme Court of India and a writer on law, politics, and society. He believes in reclaiming the universal essence of Dharma from its communal distortions.

When Faith Traveled: Islam’s Long Journey into India

 

The coming of Islam to India is often explained through only one lens, that of invasion and political conquest. This narrow view hides a far more complex and human story. Islam reached India through trade, travel, spiritual exchange and social transformation long before it arrived through armies. Conversions happened through many different processes, including voluntary acceptance, social mobility, spiritual attraction and community integration. To understand this history honestly, one must look at geography, economy, caste structure, politics and religious movements together.

Early Contact Through Trade on the Western Coast

India had strong maritime links with West Asia long before the birth of Islam. Arab traders were visiting ports of Kerala, Konkan and Gujarat for spices, pearls and textiles even in pre Islamic times. After the rise of Islam in the seventh century, these traders became carriers of the new faith along with their goods.

These merchants did not arrive as conquerors. They came as business partners. Many settled in coastal towns, married local women and became part of the social fabric. Over time, some local families adopted Islam through daily interaction, friendship and inter marriage. This process was slow and peaceful and happened across generations.

The Muslim community of Kerala known as Mappila Muslims is widely believed to have grown from these early contacts. Their culture shows deep local roots in language, food and social customs, proving that Islam in India adapted itself to regional life rather than replacing it.

The First Indian Traditionally Said to Accept Islam

According to long standing tradition in Kerala, a Chera ruler known as Cheraman Perumal is believed to be the first Indian to have accepted Islam. Popular accounts say that he traveled to Arabia, met Prophet Muhammad, accepted Islam and took the name Tajuddin. While returning to India he is believed to have died on the way, but before that he instructed that mosques be built on the Malabar coast.

Modern historians debate the historical certainty of this story because there is limited contemporary documentary proof. However, this tradition has deep cultural roots and is preserved in regional chronicles and Muslim community memory in Kerala. Whether fully historical or partly legendary, the story reflects early contact between India and the Islamic world through peaceful routes rather than military ones.

The First Mosque in India

The Cheraman Juma Mosque at Kodungallur in Kerala is traditionally regarded as the first mosque in India. It is believed to have been established around 629 CE by Malik bin Dinar, an early Muslim scholar who is said to have come to India along with other companions to spread Islamic teachings.

While historians debate the exact date of construction, there is broad agreement that some of the earliest mosques in India were built on the western coast through merchant communities and religious teachers, not through rulers or soldiers. Several mosques along the Malabar coast are linked by tradition to Malik bin Dinar and his companions, indicating that Islam spread in this region through spiritual networks and trade connections.

Entry Through Sindh and the First Political Rule

The first major political conquest by a Muslim ruler in the Indian subcontinent occurred in 712 CE when Muhammad bin Qasim defeated the ruler of Sindh. This brought parts of present day Pakistan under Muslim administration.

However, political control did not immediately result in mass religious conversion. Local populations largely continued practicing their own religions. The new rulers were more concerned with collecting revenue and maintaining stability than changing religious identity. Religious communities were allowed to manage their own institutions and customs.

This shows that political conquest and religious conversion did not always move together. The spread of Islam as a faith followed a different path from the spread of Muslim political power.

Expansion of Muslim Rule and Society in North India

From the eleventh century onward, various dynasties established Muslim rule over large parts of northern India, including the Delhi Sultanate and later the Mughal Empire. These periods saw warfare, destruction and political restructuring, but conversion was not consistently imposed as state policy.

Many Hindu elites served in courts, military and administration. Rulers were often more interested in loyalty and revenue than religious uniformity. While some rulers adopted stricter religious positions, others followed policies of tolerance and inclusion.

Conversion did occur during this period, but mostly through social processes rather than government orders. People converted for reasons ranging from spiritual belief to social opportunity.

The Powerful Role of Sufi Traditions

Perhaps the most important factor in the spread of Islam in India was the Sufi movement. Sufi teachers traveled widely across villages and towns, speaking local languages and living among common people. They preached devotion to God, humility, compassion and equality.

Sufi shrines became social centers where people of all religions gathered. Food was served freely and spiritual guidance was offered without discrimination. For many communities facing social exclusion under rigid caste structures, Sufi spaces offered dignity and belonging.

Conversion through Sufi influence was usually slow and emotional, based on personal trust and spiritual experience. This kind of conversion did not require rejection of local culture. Instead, many Sufi practices blended with regional music, poetry and customs.

Social and Economic Reasons Behind Conversion

Religion does not spread only through belief. It also spreads through social realities. In medieval India, caste divisions were harsh and deeply entrenched. For many lower status communities, conversion to Islam offered a way to escape inherited discrimination.

Islam taught formal equality among believers, at least in principle. This message was attractive to groups that faced social humiliation. Conversion also sometimes opened access to new occupations, military service and administrative roles.

In agricultural regions like Bengal and Punjab, conversion often occurred alongside settlement and farming expansion. New villages developed under Muslim landlords and over time religious identity shifted gradually rather than through sudden change.

This means conversion was often linked to everyday life decisions, not dramatic moments of religious coercion.

Was Conversion Ever Forced

History must be truthful. There were instances of coercion, destruction of religious sites and pressure to convert, especially during periods of war. Some rulers did use religion as a tool of power.

But forced conversion cannot explain the large Muslim population of India. If conversion had been mainly violent and systematic, resistance and revolt would have been constant and religious diversity would not have survived as it did.

Most historians agree that while violence occurred in specific contexts, the overall growth of Islam in India happened through social and cultural integration rather than constant compulsion.

Growth of Muslim Society Over Centuries

Once Muslim communities were established, they grew naturally through family life and community continuity. Over time, Islam became deeply Indian in language, food, dress and social behavior.

Bengali Muslims, Deccani Muslims, Kashmiri Muslims and Malayali Muslims developed distinct regional cultures. They spoke local languages, followed regional traditions and participated in local economies.

This shows that Islam did not remain an external identity. It became woven into the fabric of Indian society.

Timeline of Cultural Integration

Seventh to ninth century
Muslim traders settled in coastal towns. Mosques were built in local architectural styles. Arabic words entered local languages. Mixed families created blended traditions.

Tenth to twelfth century
Sufi teachers moved inland. Shrines became shared spiritual spaces. Devotional poetry developed in local languages. Islam spread through village level interaction.

Thirteenth to fifteenth century
Stable Muslim rule allowed social mixing. Persian influenced court culture shaped art and language. Indo Islamic architecture developed. Communities shared festivals and customs.

Sixteenth to eighteenth century
Mughal period saw cultural synthesis in painting, literature and music. Local languages absorbed Persian vocabulary. Social boundaries remained but cultural exchange flourished.

Nineteenth century onward
Colonial policies hardened religious identities. Census and political representation made religion a political category. Earlier fluid identities became rigid community labels.

Regional Patterns of Integration

In Kerala, Muslims followed matrilineal traditions in some communities and spoke Malayalam. Food and dress remained regional.

In Bengal, Islamic faith blended with folk culture and rural traditions. Bengali remained the primary language of religion and daily life.

In the Deccan, Dakhani language mixed Persian with Telugu and Marathi. Local food and clothing dominated daily life.

In Kashmir, Islamic traditions blended with earlier spiritual practices. Poetry and philosophy reflected both influences.

These examples show that Islam in India never erased regional identity. It absorbed it.

Modern Political Misuse of History

In present times, history is often simplified and used for political mobilization. Narratives of permanent conflict are promoted to divide communities. This ignores centuries of shared culture, mixed families and joint participation in economic and social life.

Most Indian Muslims are not descendants of foreign invaders. They are descendants of Indians who adopted Islam and remained rooted in their regions. Their culture, language and ancestry are Indian.

Recognizing this truth is essential for social harmony and constitutional values.

Understanding Conversion Without Fear

Conversion should not be seen only as loss or betrayal. Throughout history, people across the world have changed faiths in search of dignity, meaning and belonging. India itself has seen movements between religions for centuries.

Understanding this process does not weaken any religion. It strengthens social maturity by accepting that faith is deeply personal and historically complex.

Conclusion

Islam came to India not through one event but through many journeys. Traders brought it to the coast. Teachers carried it inland. Rulers established political structures. Communities adapted it to local life. Converts shaped it into regional cultures.

The story of Islam in India is not only about power. It is also about people, choices, relationships and shared history. It is part of the Indian story, not separate from it.

Reducing this long and layered history into slogans of invasion or victimhood serves politics, not truth. A mature society must face its past with honesty and confidence, not fear.

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Author Introduction

Siddhartha Shankar Mishra is an advocate at the Supreme Court of India and a commentator on law, politics and society. His writings blend legal insight with social critique and aim to provoke reflection on power, justice and public conscience.

Christianity in India Civilizational Roots Colonial Distortion and the Politics of Conversion

 

The history of Christianity in India is far older deeper and more complex than the narratives circulating in present political debates. It did not arrive with colonial cannons or imperial charters but entered the subcontinent quietly through trade routes spiritual exchange and cultural accommodation. To understand Indian Christianity honestly one must separate three distinct phases its ancient civilizational roots its colonial distortion and the modern political manufacture of conversion myths. Only then does the picture become historically coherent and intellectually fair.

Arrival of Christianity in India

Christian tradition and a strong body of historical scholarship hold that Christianity came to India in the first century of the Common Era around the year fifty two. It is associated with the arrival of Saint Thomas the Apostle on the Malabar Coast of present day Kerala. This coast was already integrated into a vibrant Indian Ocean trade network linking India with West Asia the Roman world and East Africa. Jewish traders Arab merchants and Persian Christians frequented these ports long before Europe emerged from antiquity.

Christianity therefore did not arrive in India as an alien ideology but as one among many spiritual currents flowing through an already plural society. The earliest Christian converts were local Jewish communities and sections of upper caste Hindu families particularly among Namboodiri Brahmins according to long standing tradition. These communities came to be known as Saint Thomas Christians or Nasranis.

An Indian Christianity not a European transplant

For nearly fifteen centuries Indian Christianity developed without European involvement. This alone demolishes the popular claim that Christianity in India is a colonial implant. During this long period Indian Christians spoke local languages followed Indian customs dressed like their neighbors and organized themselves as jati like communities within the Indian social order.

Their liturgy was in Syriac not Latin. Their theology was linked to Eastern Christian traditions rather than Roman Catholicism. Their churches resembled local architectural forms often indistinguishable from temples except for the cross. Festivals included oil lamps flowers processions and music rooted in Indian aesthetics. Christianity here did not seek to replace Indian culture but lived within it.

Crucially there was no alliance with political power. Indian Christians had no state backing no army and no institutional machinery to enforce belief. They survived through acceptance coexistence and ethical credibility. Hindu rulers donated land to churches just as they did to temples and Buddhist monasteries. Jewish Christian and Hindu communities lived side by side on the Malabar Coast with remarkable harmony for centuries.

Caste and social reality

A difficult but necessary truth is that Indian Christianity did not abolish caste instantly. Converts carried their social identities into the new faith as was common across Indian religious traditions. Buddhism Jainism and even Bhakti movements did not erase caste overnight. Religion in India historically adapted to social realities before gradually questioning them.

This does not weaken the ethical force of Christianity but rather situates it honestly within Indian society. Social transformation was slow contested and evolutionary not revolutionary. The expectation that a faith should instantly dissolve entrenched hierarchies is a modern moral projection not a historical reality.

The colonial rupture

The character of Christianity in India changed dramatically only in the sixteenth century with the arrival of European colonial powers particularly Portugal. With colonialism faith became entangled with empire. European missionaries often dismissed indigenous Christian practices as inferior or heretical. Latin liturgy was imposed. Local traditions were suppressed. Cultural arrogance replaced accommodation.

The Goa Inquisition stands as a dark reminder of how Christianity when fused with state power can become coercive and violent. Importantly this coercion was directed not only at Hindus and Muslims but also at Indian Christians who resisted European control.

The most powerful symbol of this resistance is the Coonan Cross Oath of sixteen fifty three when thousands of Indian Christians publicly vowed never to submit to foreign ecclesiastical domination. This was not a rejection of Christianity but a rejection of imperial Christianity. Indian Christians fought to preserve their indigenous identity and autonomy.

Distinguishing ancient and colonial Christianity

This distinction is vital yet deliberately blurred in modern discourse. Ancient Indian Christianity was decentralized non coercive and culturally integrated. Colonial Christianity was centralized coercive and culturally imperial. To blame the former for the crimes of the latter is historically dishonest.

Conversion during the ancient period was rare gradual and personal. Communities remained small endogamous and socially embedded. Mass conversion as a phenomenon emerged only under colonial conditions where material incentives institutional pressure and power asymmetry existed. Even then it was not universal nor uncontested.

The manufacture of conversion myths

The modern obsession with conversion is not rooted in historical experience but in political anxiety. For nearly fifteen hundred years conversion was not a social panic in India. It became one only in the twentieth century when democracy enabled marginalized communities to exercise choice.

Conversion myths thrive because they serve power. They portray oppressed groups as victims without agency and dominant groups as eternal guardians of culture. They erase caste violence and social exclusion while blaming faith choice for social instability.

People do not abandon ancestral traditions lightly. When they do it is rarely due to theological persuasion alone. It is often a response to humiliation exclusion and denial of dignity. Conversion becomes a moral accusation only when equality threatens hierarchy.

Indian secularism as civilizational instinct

India did not invent pluralism in nineteen forty seven. It inherited it from its own civilizational past. The subcontinent has always accommodated multiple philosophies rituals and belief systems. Disagreement was normal dissent was sacred and belief was personal.

Pre modern Indian rulers governed without enforcing religious uniformity. They supported multiple institutions across faiths. The idea that one religion must dominate public life is not Indian but imported from exclusivist political theologies elsewhere.

The Constitution of India did not impose secularism as a foreign concept. It codified a lived historical reality while attempting to protect it from modern majoritarian politics.

Power not belief is the real danger

The consistent pattern across history is clear. Religion becomes violent not because it exists but because it captures power. Christianity without empire coexisted peacefully for centuries in India. Hinduism without state enforcement absorbed dissent and diversity. Islam without political absolutism flourished intellectually.

The danger lies not in faith but in the fusion of faith with state authority. When belief becomes law dissent becomes treason and diversity becomes threat.

Conclusion

Christianity in India is not a colonial shadow but an ancient Indian presence. Its roots lie in trade not conquest in dialogue not domination. Colonialism distorted its image and contemporary politics weaponizes that distortion. Conversion myths collapse under historical scrutiny. Indian secularism emerges not as imitation but as memory. India never feared many religions. It feared one religion becoming power.

Author’s Introduction

Siddhartha Shankar Mishra is an advocate at the Supreme Court of India and a commentator on law politics and society. His writings blend legal insight with social critique and aim to provoke reflection on power justice and public conscience.

 

The Long Shadow of Golwalkar and the Making of a Majoritarian Republic

 

The Rise of Golwalkar and the Transformation of the RSS

When Dr K B Hedgewar founded the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh in 1925 he imagined a disciplined cultural organisation that would uplift a disillusioned Hindu society. But the ideological transformation of the RSS truly began only after his death in 1940 when M S Golwalkar succeeded him as Sarsanghchalak. Hedgewar had prioritised unity self discipline and restrained political engagement. Golwalkar however infused the organisation with a doctrinal clarity that turned the RSS into a structured project of Hindu nationhood. Under him the RSS became a cadre based institution where unity was not a celebration of diversity but a demand for cultural homogeneity. The shakha became the forge where a generation was trained to view India not as a plural republic but as a sacred civilizational homeland of Hindus.

Defining a Hindu Nation Civilizational Identity over Civic Citizenship

Golwalkar’s writings such as we or our nationhood defined and bunch of thoughts placed Hindu identity at the centre of national belonging. He repeatedly argued that minorities could remain in India only if they accepted the cultural supremacy of the Hindu way of life. In his imagination citizenship was not a contract among equals but a system of graded belonging where Hindus claimed cultural primacy while others were expected to assimilate. Religious diversity was not an asset to be nurtured but a deviation to be corrected. The RSS under Golwalkar thus shifted from cultural self confidence to cultural majoritarianism a shift that would later echo through Indian politics long after his death.

Divergence from the Freedom Struggle and Antagonism toward Gandhi

While Jawaharlal Nehru Subhas Bose Sarojini Naidu and countless others mobilised mass movements for independence Golwalkar chose to keep the RSS away from the anti colonial struggle. He believed that strengthening Hindu society internally was more important than confronting the British externally. Critics argued that this posture conveniently shielded the RSS from colonial repression while distancing it from the moral authority of the freedom movement. Golwalkar accused Gandhi of weakening Hindu society by engaging with Muslim leaders and seeking unity through persuasion rather than cultural dominance. The RSS distance from the freedom struggle was therefore not accidental but ideological born of a suspicion that mass nationalism diluted Hindu primacy.

A Warning three weeks before the Assassination

In the winter of 1947 shortly after the bloodshed of Partition M S Golwalkar addressed a gathering where he condemned what he saw as moral weakness and appeasement in national politics. In that fraught atmosphere as Gandhi persisted with his final fasts calling for harmony and the release of withheld funds to Pakistan Golwalkar’s words carried a dark edge. At a public meeting in early December 1947 he declared that certain policies pursued by national leaders were unIndian and satanic and added that we have the means whereby such men can be immediately silenced if they continue to harm Hindu interests.

“On 8 December 1947, RSS chief M S Golwalkar at a rally described certain government and Gandhi-led policies as ‘unIndian and satanic’ and declared that ‘we have the means whereby such men can be immediately silenced’ if they stood in the way of protecting Hindu interests.”

This was not an order nor a call to arms yet the sentiment reflected a deep and open hostility toward Gandhi’s final effort to preserve moral citizenship across faiths. When seen in the hindsight of Gandhi’s assassination only weeks later this remark remains an enduring and troubling reminder of the volatile ideological climate of the time.

Gandhis Assassination the RSS Ban and a Permanent Stain of Suspicion

The assassination of Mahatma Gandhi on 30 January 1948 intensified scrutiny of this hostility. Though Golwalkar and the RSS were not legally proven to be part of the conspiracy the fact that Nathuram Godse had once been associated with the organisation and had absorbed similar ideological influences cast a long shadow. The government banned the RSS arguing that the ideological poison that had vilified Gandhi could no longer be ignored. The ban was lifted a year later only after the RSS formally declared respect for the Constitution. But this episode left a stain that history has never fully washed away for it raised the question of whether cultural nationalism can slide into moral absolutism where dissent is seen as a threat rather than a voice to be engaged.

Recasting Public Image without Abandoning Majoritarian Ideology

After the ban was lifted Golwalkar worked hard to present the RSS as socially constructive. Educational and charitable work expanded and the language of public statements became more cautious. Yet he never surrendered the idea that India must be rooted in Hindu cultural primacy. Minorities were recognised but their equal belonging remained conditional on acceptance of majority cultural norms. The RSS under Golwalkar mastered the art of balancing constitutional language with a cultural imagination that waited for its political moment.

Golwalkars Legacy in the Modi Era Majoritarian Ideas Enter State Policy

Nearly eight decades later Golwalkar’s influence has travelled from the shakha ground to the centre of power. Narendra Modi a lifelong RSS pracharak articulates a political vision that resonates deeply with Golwalkar’s worldview. Policies such as the Citizenship Amendment Act the promotion of a Uniform Civil Code and the centrality of Hindu cultural symbols in national politics all reflect this continuity. The inauguration of the Ayodhya temple by a sitting Prime Minister blurred the line between state authority and religious symbolism in ways that fulfil long standing RSS aspirations. Critics argue that this represents the political mainstreaming of Golwalkar’s vision turning cultural majoritarianism into the guiding framework of governance.

From Cultural Movement to Political Blueprint The Constitution Reimagined

Golwalkar had criticised the framers of the Constitution for not rooting the document in Hindu philosophical tradition. Today his critiques resurface indirectly through institutional shifts that seek to harmonise state authority with majoritarian cultural norms. Revised textbooks emphasise ancient Hindu achievements national universities are pushed toward cultural revivalism and public rhetoric routinely frames diversity as fragmentation. What was once a cultural mission now appears to many observers as a political blueprint enacted through electoral legitimacy.

Is the RSS Communal The Ideology of Unity through Assimilation

The RSS rejects the label communal and claims it seeks unity. But unity of what kind. When equal citizenship is conditional on cultural assimilation and when plurality is tolerated only if it bows to majority norms unity becomes indistinguishable from a project of majoritarian dominance. The question is not whether the RSS preaches hatred. The deeper question is whether its ideological structure produces exclusion and hierarchy by redefining citizenship through cultural identity rather than equal rights. In this sense the RSS may not call itself communal but its framework inevitably creates communal outcomes because its idea of India is rooted first in culture and only then in citizenship.

Author Introduction

Siddhartha Shankar Mishra is an advocate at the Supreme Court of India and a commentator on law politics and society. His writings blend legal insight with social critique and aim to provoke reflection on power justice and public conscience.