Difficult Phase for Parvez Musharraf , JUSTINPRINT, JUNE 1-15-2013 ( INTERNATIONAL )

Difficult Phase for Parvez Musharraf  www.justinprint.in

A lot is happening in the life of Pervez Musharraf – the former Pakistan army chief boldly sauntered into Pakistan sometime back purportedly to save the troubled nation from chaos. The general, however, is facing a tough time saving himself from chaos, when, denied bail by a Pakistan High court, he fled from the court premises, only to be arrested later at his residence.

Musharraf declared "emergency rule" in 2007 when he was quickly losing popularity in Pakistan fashioning himself as an authoritative ruler over Pakistan. He resigned from office in 2008 to avoid the risk of being impeached. Since then he was in a self-imposed exile outside of Pakistan until this year when he returned to the country.

By 2008, Musharraf had been defeated in the elections he was forced to hold. He hastily left the country for a posh London exile . But last month, he finally made good on his promise to return home. It was a characteristically bold move for the ex-commando. Musharraf had already been warned that he could face a trial for alleged misdeeds in office. He may not have been warned that ordinary citizens were liable to greet his return with a disdainful shrug. On landing in Karachi, the former president was welcomed by a noticeably small crowd—a significant embarassment in a country where pols dispense money to assemble friendly throngs. 

Musharraf’s humiliating month is heartening for democracy advocates, who are glad to see a former strongman face justice (even when the charges are partially motivated by personal vendettas). But there is a larger irony, one befitting the latest chapter in the biography of a military man better known for tactical successes than strategic triumphs: The two sectors of Pakistani society most energetically tormenting Musharraf—the media and the judiciary—are ones that he strengthened during his near-decade in power. And the pillar of society that created him—the military—is standing idly by.

In the early months of 1999, Pakistani soldiers, along with indigenous Kashmiri fighters, crossed the Line of Control that separates the Indian and Pakistani areas of Kashmir, focusing on a district called Kargil. It was a daring maneuver. Musharraf, the lead instigator, initially looked clever, garnering accolades and support from the nationalist media. But strategic thinking was never Musharraf’s forte: India responded, and quickly recaptured the ground it had lost; Pakistan was forced into the humiliating retreat that would likely have appeared predictable to anyone who bothered to think through the long-term consequences of the assault. The discord that the disaster brought about in Pakistani politics did, however, allow Musharraf to orchestrate a coup several months later against the civilian government. 

This is very wrong to label some executives’ decisions as unconstitutional by any future government in any country. This is particularly true of Pakistan where even today the democracy is in a nascent stage. The judiciary is no holy cow in Pakistan and it still has to learn its ways. What Mr. Musharraf did was not his personal decisions. They were the collective decisions of the then government of Pakistan and many were outside the domain of military establishment there. It is outlandish to blame Mr. Musharraf for all the ills of his time and thereafter. Mr. Musharraf’s rule was not that bad, neither the present coalition government’s rule is that good. This is bad to have strange memories and inconsistent behavior.

The fact is that national politics in Pakistan may move towards the less-than-majority bipartisanism. Such a transition may be temporary and fragile but such would affect Pakistan positively. This is not to suggest that there would not be proliferation of political identities in Pakistan or that extremism would not rise, but politics in Pakistan is more likely to be more centralized and more bipolar after the return, disqualification and arrest of Mr. Musharraf. This is how Pakistan works and probably the whole of the South Asia too. But once his job is finished, Mr. Musharraf should be either pardoned honorably or he should be allowed to go on to exile again. Just like Hosni Mubarak it is foolish to take revenge from former President of Pakistan for reasons those that were not necessarily personality-based. One only hopes that the US has some stakes in the whole episode and that the good sense would prevail in the end.

Today, neither the military nor its sometime American sponsor are inclined to do much for Musharraf. Washington may have once seen him as a bendable strongman, but there is no interest in backing an unpopular former general. The military itself, although antsy about the possible symbolism of a former military leader in prison, has little love for its former chief. Anti-Americanism is much stronger in the country today than it was in Musharraf's era, and thus his closeness to the United States is something the military would rather forget. 

Musharraf will likely be tried for various allege crimes including the murder of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, Balochi nationalist leader Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti. Additionally, he is primarily being convicted for his dismissal of most of the Supreme Court after his second election in 2007 in order to instate judges that would verify his victory in the contested election.

His case represents an interesting aspect of Pakistani politics and the maturation of the political system. The fact that he felt comfortable about coming back to Pakistan with a pre-arrest bail and there was no overt military support for his return, speaks volumes. The fear was that the military might think that a case against him would draw the current leadership of the army into the courtroom drama. But the army did not provide special security or issue any major supporting statement on his return. And the Islamabad High Court held its hand on using the case to bring the army into discussion, for now.

Could Pakistan survive another high-profile assassination or assassination attempt in a season when many candidates, especially in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, have been killed by the TTP? Conspiracy theorists contend that a high-profile killing might provide an excuse for the postponement of elections and an extension of the caretaker regime, allowing it to effect changes in the economic and perhaps political system for the better. But the less than agile handling of so many issues, may not contribute to raising confidence in the caretakers.

The former army chief returned in March after nearly four years of self-imposed exile to contest a May 11 general election, but election officers disqualified him because of court cases pending against him.

In what newspapers described as a veiled reference to Musharraf’s legal troubles, Army Chief General Ashfaq Kayani said: “In my opinion, it is not merely retribution, but awareness and participation of the masses that can truly end this game of hide and seek between democracy and dictatorship.”

Kayani, arguably the most powerful figure in Pakistan, was delivering a Martyrs’ Day speech at army headquarters. Newspapers carried his comments on front pages.

The military has ruled Pakistan for than half of its 66-year-history, through coups or from behind the scenes. It sets security and foreign policy, even when civilian governments are in power.

Current commanders have meddled less in politics, letting civilian governments take the heat for policy failures.

But Kayani has had an uneasy relationship with civilian leaders, as well as an increasingly interventionist Supreme Court, which has questioned the military’s human rights record.

The chief justice, Iftikhar Chaudhry, was embroiled in a confrontation with Musharraf, who removed him from office in 2007 after he opposed plans to extend the general’s stay in power. Chaudhry was later reinstated.

Musharraf’s has been embroiled in legal issues since his return.

He became the first former army chief to be arrested in Pakistan when police took him into custody at their headquarters last Friday, breaking an unwritten rule that the top ranks of the military are untouchable, even after they have retired.

Thousands of people in Gahkuch took the streets to protest against the arrest of former President and Pakistan’s flamboyant Military General Pervez Musharraf. Protesters chanted slogans in favor of Musharraf and lamented what they call Judicial Activism in Pakistan.

Protesters formed a large rally that marched through Gahkuch Bazar. Hundreds of retired military men and a large number of civilians demanded government to drop the charges against the former president and to immediately release the man of ‘Pakistan First’

The protest rally later converted into an assemblage addressed by many local notables and APML supporters. Speakers numerated Musharraf’s developmental projects in the region. They said that the Karakuram University, mobile service, increased developmental funds, several administrative measures, and loan write-offs are services for which Musharraf will be remembered in the region for a long time.

They said that the lone man without democratic roots has done far more than what the so-called democratic parties claim that they can do.

The Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz, has criticised nearly the entire range of policies pursued by the previous government led by Gen (retd) Musharraf. The United States is already in the process of adjusting to the big change in Islamabad, praising Gen (retd) Pervez Musharraf for his efforts in the war on terror but welcoming the new army chief and democracy. India is less sure whether the process of normalisation started by Gen Musharraf will continue.

The fact is that decisions under a democratic dispensation are always difficult to take and democracies tend to be unwieldy even on issues of great importance. The manner in which the internal political struggle unfolded in India on the US-India civilian nuclear deal is a case in point. Equally, however, democratic governments, after trying long and hard to win adherents, can also go out on a limb and take risks — that is exactly what the UPA government in India did and carried the day. Foreign policy contours do not change overnight; they are guided by a country’s core interests based on a number of determinants. What is different about democratic debate in theory is that it provides various forums for a debate on actual decisions. It is time consuming but allows crucial input at multiple levels. The debate also brings with it the vital element of buy-in for a policy. In other words, the policy is rooted in the public as far as this can be achieved and is desirable.

There is also consolation that the PPP and the PMLN have pledged to “normalise” with India and Afghanistan. But the Zardari government has gone further than General (retd) Musharraf was prepared to go with India in opening up trade. This is a good development and constitutes a needed break with the old Pakistani approach that was based on Kashmir first and then everything else. General Musharraf’s out-of-the-box thinking effectively put paid to the UN Resolutions much like Nawaz Sharif did in the Lahore Summit in 1999 and Mr Zardari must move in the same direction in conformity with the aspirations of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. This is in keeping with the spirit of the dialogue framework with India, especially the back channel that General (retd) Musharraf opened with Dr Manmohan Singh. Both Mr Zardari and Mr Sharif have also announced that they would like to see an easing of visa restrictions with India. Good. It seems that the pressures of governance have induced a generous dose of pragmatism in their thinking to keep the foreign policy directed in favour of the national economy.

Musharraf may be prosecuted for high treason under the command responsibility doctrine. In international criminal law, the command responsibility doctrine has been employed to hold civilian leaders and military commanders responsible for crimes committed by their subordinates. This concept can be transferred to domestic jurisprudence to hold the top leader responsible for high treason committed with the connivance of subordinates. Under command responsibility, the top leader cannot lawfully demand that all subordinates who agreed to obey him in the commission of high treason be also prosecuted. The top commander is responsible for high treason even if the generals under his command endorse the decision to suspend the constitution and proclaim unlawful emergency.

Musharraf's argument that he cannot be singled out for the crime of high treason is without legal merit. Even in ordinary violations of law, such as speeding on a highway, a violator cannot successfully argue that a patrol officer must either issue traffic tickets to all who are speeding or to none. This legal logic will increase violations of speed limit because rarely does the highway patrol have the resources to stop every person engaged in speeding. Of course, the selective enforcement of law, including traffic regulations, on the sole basis of race, religion, or any other arbitrary classification will be offensive to the notions of fairness, equal protection, and justice. The selective justice argument, however, loses in almost every other context.

Most important, the argument of selective justice is particularly unavailable in high crimes, including genocide, torture, enforced disappearances, and high treason. Every person who commits high crime is personally liable and cannot invoke the notion of selective justice. Throughout the world, high treason is such a serious crime that states that have otherwise abolished death penalty retain capital punishment for high treason. When the top military general, donning his military uniform, undermines a democratic constitutional order and detains judges of the nation's highest court, he cannot invoke selective justice to avoid punishment for high treason. A military usurper deserves no mercy or forgiveness for non-enforcement of the law of high treason invites future subversions of the democratic constitution.

Given the legal challenges, lack of support and Taliban threats, many experts have been left scratching their heads as to why Musharraf returned to Pakistan. Some have speculated he misjudged the level of public backing he would get, while others suggested he was simply homesick.

Siddhartha Shankar Mishra,

Sambalpur,Odisha