RSS and the Indian National Flag: History, Ideology and the Continuing Controversy Part I

 

The Indian National Flag is more than a symbol of sovereignty. It represents the ideals of the freedom movement, constitutional democracy, and the unity of an extraordinarily diverse nation. Yet, few aspects of modern Indian history remain as politically contested as the relationship between the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and the Tricolour. While the RSS today publicly honours the National Flag and actively participates in campaigns such as Har Ghar Tiranga, its historical relationship with the Tricolour has been the subject of continuing debate. The controversy stems not from political rhetoric alone but from documented writings, editorials, and historical records dating back to the years surrounding India's independence.

The Birth of the Tricolour

India's National Flag did not emerge overnight. Several versions of a national flag were proposed during the freedom struggle. The design that eventually became the National Flag was based on the flag designed by Pingali Venkayya and was modified by replacing the spinning wheel with the Ashoka Chakra.

On 22 July 1947, the Constituent Assembly formally adopted the Tricolour as the National Flag of independent India. Presenting the resolution, Jawaharlal Nehru described the flag as a symbol that belonged not to any religion, political party or community but to the entire nation. Members of the Assembly, including Dr. Rajendra Prasad, Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, Sarojini Naidu and others, supported its adoption. The Tricolour thus became a constitutional symbol accepted by representatives from across India's political and ideological spectrum.

The RSS and the Bhagwa Dhwaj

The RSS, founded in 1925 by Dr. K. B. Hedgewar, had long regarded the Bhagwa Dhwaj (Saffron Flag) as its organisational and cultural emblem. According to RSS ideology, the saffron flag represented sacrifice, renunciation, courage and India's ancient civilisational heritage. Even today, the Bhagwa Dhwaj occupies a central place in RSS functions.

The organisation's reverence for the saffron flag, however, became controversial when India adopted the Tricolour as its National Flag. Critics argued that the RSS's attachment to the Bhagwa Dhwaj reflected an unwillingness to fully embrace the Tricolour as the symbol of the newly independent Republic. RSS supporters, on the other hand, maintain that the Bhagwa Dhwaj was never intended to replace the National Flag but was merely the organisation's cultural emblem.

The Organiser Editorial of 14 August 1947

One of the principal sources of controversy is the RSS-linked weekly Organiser. In its edition dated 14 August 1947, published a day before Independence, the newspaper criticised the adoption of the Tricolour. The editorial argued that the three-coloured flag lacked the historical and cultural significance of the saffron flag and suggested that it would not command the same emotional respect among Hindus.

This editorial has frequently been cited by historians and political commentators as evidence that sections of the RSS were uncomfortable with the National Flag adopted by the Constituent Assembly. The editorial remains one of the most important documentary sources in this debate because it reflects a contemporary viewpoint expressed at the very moment India attained independence.

Golwalkar's Critique

The controversy was further reinforced by the writings of Madhav Sadashiv Golwalkar, the second Sarsanghchalak of the RSS and one of its principal ideologues.

In Bunch of Thoughts, Golwalkar questioned why independent India had adopted a new National Flag instead of what he regarded as the traditional saffron banner. He described the adoption of the new flag as an act of "drifting and imitating," suggesting that India's leaders had abandoned an indigenous civilisational symbol in favour of a modern political creation.

Although RSS supporters argue that Golwalkar was expressing a cultural preference rather than rejecting the National Flag itself, critics contend that his remarks reveal an ideological discomfort with the Tricolour that cannot be ignored.

Golwalkar's writings continue to occupy a central place in discussions about the RSS because they shaped the organisation's intellectual outlook for decades after Independence.

Did the RSS Reject the Tricolour?

This question requires careful historical analysis. It would be inaccurate to claim that the RSS legally rejected the National Flag or declared it invalid. Equally, it would be misleading to ignore the documented criticism contained in Organiser and Golwalkar's writings.

Historical evidence shows that the RSS's relationship with the Tricolour was, at the very least, uneasy during the years immediately following Independence. Whether this amounted to outright rejection or ideological preference for another symbol remains a matter of interpretation. However, the documentary record leaves little doubt that the organisation did not initially embrace the Tricolour with the enthusiasm shown by most participants in the freedom movement.

This distinction is important because history should be judged by contemporaneous evidence rather than later political explanations. The debate is therefore not merely about who hoisted a flag or when; it is about the ideological meaning attached to national symbols during one of the most significant moments in India's history.

Part II will examine the claim that Jawaharlal Nehru prevented the RSS from hoisting the National Flag, the legal position before and after the Flag Code of 2002, the Supreme Court's decision in the Naveen Jindal case, the RSS's later position, and conclude with detailed footnotes and references.

About the Author

Adv. Siddhartha Shankar Mishra is an Advocate, Supreme Court of India, columnist and freelance writer.

 

 

The Dark Age of Public Discourse: India’s Political Climate Since 2014

 

In every democracy there are moments when political disagreement sharpens into hostility. Yet there are also periods when the very tone of public life begins to change. India, a nation that once prided itself on plural debate and moral restraint in politics, appears to be passing through such a moment. Over the past decade, particularly since 2014, the language of politics has hardened, public discourse has grown increasingly hostile, and the institutions meant to safeguard democratic balance have come under visible strain. Many observers describe this moment not merely as political transition but as a troubling descent into a darker age of democratic culture.

The year 2014 marked a major turning point in Indian politics. The electoral victory of Narendra Modi and the rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party with an absolute parliamentary majority ended decades of coalition politics. For many citizens this moment symbolized hope for decisive governance, economic reform and administrative efficiency. The promise of development, strong leadership and national pride resonated deeply with a large section of the electorate.

However, the political transformation that followed did not remain confined to governance alone. It gradually reshaped the tone of political conversation in the country. Public discourse began to revolve increasingly around identity, loyalty and ideological conformity. Political debate moved away from policy and toward narratives of cultural and national belonging. The result was a climate where disagreement was often interpreted as hostility toward the nation itself.

One of the most visible symptoms of this shift has been the deterioration of parliamentary decorum. Parliament, historically regarded as the highest forum of democratic debate, has increasingly witnessed angry exchanges, personal attacks and abusive rhetoric. Members of Parliament who are expected to represent the dignity of democratic institutions sometimes resort to language that would once have been considered unacceptable within legislative halls. When lawmakers themselves normalize hostility, the message inevitably travels beyond Parliament into society.

The decline in parliamentary civility reflects a deeper transformation in political culture. Political parties across the spectrum have always engaged in sharp criticism, but the present era has witnessed a more aggressive form of discourse amplified by digital media. Social media platforms have become arenas of ideological warfare where abuse, misinformation and character assassination circulate freely. Organized online campaigns often target journalists, activists and political opponents with coordinated hostility.

The rise of political trolling networks has played a significant role in this transformation. Digital platforms that could have strengthened democratic dialogue have instead been weaponized to silence dissent and amplify propaganda. Critics of government policies frequently face online harassment, while complex political questions are reduced to simplistic slogans. The speed and reach of digital media have made it easier for emotional narratives to overshadow reasoned discussion.

Another dimension of this political climate is the increasing polarization of society along religious and cultural lines. Debates about nationalism and identity have intensified, often creating suspicion between communities. Instead of reinforcing the constitutional principle of equal citizenship, political rhetoric sometimes emphasizes cultural majoritarianism. Such narratives deepen divisions and weaken the inclusive foundations upon which the Indian republic was built.

The ideological influence of organizations such as the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh has also become more visible in the national conversation. Supporters view this as a long overdue cultural correction that reasserts civilizational identity. Others see it as an attempt to redefine the secular character of the Indian state. Regardless of perspective, the ideological debate has become sharper and more emotionally charged.

The impact of this environment is not limited to politics alone. It shapes the functioning of institutions as well. Independent institutions such as investigative agencies, universities and even sections of the media often find themselves drawn into ideological conflicts. When institutions appear to align with political narratives, public trust begins to erode. Democracy ultimately depends not only on elections but also on the credibility of institutions that operate beyond electoral politics.

The media landscape too has undergone a dramatic transformation. Sections of television media increasingly prioritize sensationalism over substance. Prime time debates frequently resemble shouting contests rather than thoughtful analysis. Anchors sometimes act less like moderators and more like participants in ideological battles. This environment reinforces polarization instead of fostering understanding.

Yet it would be simplistic to attribute the entire transformation solely to one political party or government. The deeper issue lies in the erosion of democratic ethics across the political spectrum. Opposition parties, while criticizing the ruling establishment, have often struggled to articulate a coherent alternative vision. Political opportunism and rhetorical excess are not confined to any single ideological camp.

Moreover, the electorate itself has become more emotionally invested in political identity. Political loyalty increasingly resembles cultural affiliation. Supporters defend leaders with fervor, while opponents respond with equal intensity. In such an atmosphere nuance becomes rare. Complex policy questions are overshadowed by ideological narratives.

However, describing the present moment as a “dark age” should not imply that democracy has collapsed. India continues to hold competitive elections, courts continue to function, and citizens continue to express dissent in multiple ways. Civil society organizations, independent journalists and concerned citizens still raise questions about governance and accountability. The resilience of Indian democracy lies precisely in this persistent ability to debate and correct itself.

History shows that democracies often experience phases of heightened polarization before rediscovering equilibrium. The essential question is whether political leadership and citizens alike are willing to restore civility and constitutional values to the center of public life. Democracy is sustained not only by laws and institutions but also by the ethical conduct of those who participate in it.

For Parliament in particular, the challenge is urgent. Legislative debate must once again become a forum of reason rather than spectacle. Political leaders must recognize that abusive rhetoric may produce short term applause but ultimately weakens the dignity of democratic institutions. Public representatives carry the responsibility of setting standards for national conversation.

The decade since 2014 has undeniably reshaped India’s political landscape. It has produced strong leadership, intense ideological debate and unprecedented digital mobilization. Yet it has also revealed the fragility of democratic culture when civility and restraint disappear from public life.

Whether this period will ultimately be remembered as a dark age or as a difficult phase of democratic evolution depends on the choices made today. Democracies do not decline overnight. They decline gradually when language becomes toxic, institutions become partisan and citizens begin to see each other as enemies rather than fellow participants in a shared republic.

The path forward lies not in silencing political differences but in restoring the ethics of democratic disagreement. India’s constitutional vision was never about uniformity of thought. It was about coexistence within diversity. The future of the republic will depend on whether that principle is defended with the same passion with which political battles are fought today.

 

Author: Siddhartha Shankar Mishra is an advocate at the Supreme Court of India and a commentator on law, politics and society.

 

 

The Vadnagar Express: Non-Stop to Political Mythology

 

Since 1881, Vadnagar station has seen many passengers, but none marketed as vigorously as its most famous chaiwala. From tea stalls to missing certificates and Himalayan wanderings, Modi’s journey reads less like history and more like a political mythology running non-stop.

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Of Tea, Tracks, and Certificates: The Modi Origin Story

History, like tea, tastes different depending on who is brewing it. In India’s political kitchen, the most over-boiled concoction is the story of a boy who sold tea at a railway station and then ascended to the throne of Delhi. Stirring this tale with facts, dates, and a pinch of satire, one finds a brew that is less divine elixir and more political marketing.

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The Setting of the Stage: Vadnagar 1881

Let us begin not with Modi’s birth in 1950, but with the birth of his stage: the Vadnagar railway station. Built in 1881 during the British Raj as part of the Mehsana–Vadnagar narrow-gauge line, the station stood there decades before Modi’s first cry echoed through Vadnagar.

By the 1960s, it was still a sleepy station. Few trains, fewer passengers, but — according to political folklore — the perfect place for a child entrepreneur to launch his tea empire. If one believes the campaign posters, this wasn’t a boy pouring hot water into an aluminum kettle; it was the Indian Dream incarnate, brewing itself on a wooden bench.

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1950: The Birth of the Brand

Narendra Damodardas Modi was born on 17 September 1950, to Damodardas and Hiraba Modi. The family belonged to the Ghanchi community — traditional oil pressers, later petty traders.

In most biographies, this is where the violin music starts: a poor child helping his father at a railway tea stall. In most political speeches, this is where the violin becomes a marching band: “A son of the soil, a chaiwala!”

But satire, like truth, demands an awkward question: if the station existed since 1881, why was it rediscovered only in 2014 election rallies?

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1960s: Of School Bells and Steam Whistles

Modi’s schooling in Vadnagar during the 1960s has been described as modest. Teachers called him average in academics but keen in debates and drama. He loved playing the role of a saint on stage — a foreshadowing of how politics itself would later become his theatre.

Meanwhile, the railway station, that eternal supporting actor, became the centrepiece of the story. As if the planks of its benches held the prophecy of future prime ministership. One wonders if the British engineers of 1881 knew that their humble platform would one day be marketed more vigorously than the Taj Mahal.

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Certificates: The Scriptwriters’ Headache

Education is usually a ladder. In Modi’s case, it is a mystery novel.

• School Leaving: Yes, he studied in Vadnagar. That much is certain.
• Higher Studies: Here comes the suspense. Modi claims a BA from Delhi University (1978) and an MA from Gujarat University (1983).
• The Twist: In 2016, when RTI activists demanded proof, universities produced documents, but the plot thickened with spelling errors, mismatched details, and missing records.

The opposition cried forgery; supporters cried foul. Meanwhile, the Prime Minister maintained saintly silence, perhaps thinking: why bother with degrees when you can confer doctorates on yourself through electoral victories?

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Early 1970s: The Wandering Monk

After finishing school, Modi reportedly left home, seeking spiritual enlightenment. He is said to have wandered the Himalayas, stayed at Ramakrishna Mission ashrams, and lived a life of meditation.

The problem is — no diary, no witness, no railway ticket survives from this wandering. It is as if history itself chose to respect his privacy. In storytelling terms, this is the convenient “interval” — the hero disappears, only to return transformed.

One can’t help but suspect that the monk’s robes were less about renunciation and more about rehearsal: practicing solitude before embracing power.

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Mid-1970s: RSS, Emergency, and Political Birth

By 1974, Modi returned to Vadnagar, this time not with a kettle but with pamphlets. He joined the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and plunged into the Navnirman Movement, a student agitation against corruption in Gujarat.

During the Emergency (1975–77), he worked underground, distributing anti-government literature. For the RSS, he was not yet the star, but a backstage hand, arranging lights and props for the ideological theatre.

From tea-seller to underground activist, the biography was already acquiring cinematic pace. All it needed was a national stage and a good director.

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Satire Brewing

Now let’s pause and sip the contradictions.

1. The Station: Built in 1881, yet sold to us in 2014 as if Modi had personally laid the tracks.
2. The Tea: A humble family occupation turned into an epic saga, proof that poverty is not to be eradicated but glamorized.
3. The Certificates: Produced late, riddled with errors, but defended like holy scriptures.
4. The Wandering: A decade of supposed spiritual search that no one can confirm, but everyone must believe.

If a novelist wrote such a character, critics would accuse him of exaggeration. In India, we elect him.

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The Larger Irony

The tea-seller story was once a tale of humble origins. Today, it has mutated into a corporate brand. Government ads, election posters, and foreign tours all boil the same kettle: he rose from nothing, therefore everything he does is right.

But should poverty be used as a perpetual campaign poster? Should selling tea at a station in the 1960s guarantee immunity from questions in 2025? By that logic, every rickshaw-puller is a prime minister-in-waiting.

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Timeline Recap (for those who prefer railway schedules):

• 1881: Vadnagar railway station built.
• 1950: Modi born in Vadnagar.
• 1960s: Schooling; assisted at family’s tea stall.
• Early 1970s: Leaves home, wanders Himalayas, joins Ramakrishna Mission ashrams.
• 1974: Returns, joins RSS during Navnirman agitation.
• 1975–77: Works underground during Emergency.
• 1978: Alleged BA from Delhi University.
• 1983: Alleged MA from Gujarat University.

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In Sum

In sum, the Modi narrative is a clever blend of half-truths, omissions, and exaggerations. Yes, there was a tea stall. Yes, there was a wandering phase. Yes, there are certificates. But around these fragments, an empire of political mythology has been built — one that transforms a man’s modest life into a legend, while leaving inconvenient facts by the roadside.

About the Author

The author, Siddhartha Mishra, is an Advocate at the Supreme Court of India. He writes frequently on law, politics, and society, blending legal precision with sharp satire. He can be reached at ssmishra33@gmail.com  

References

Andersen, W. K., & Damle, S. D. (2018). RSS: A view to the inside. Penguin Random House India.

Caravan Magazine. (2014, July). Myth and the making of Modi. The Caravan. Retrieved from https://caravanmagazine.in

Dasgupta, S. (2014, April). The political phenomenon called Narendra Modi. India Today. Retrieved from https://www.indiatoday.in

Delhi University & Gujarat University. (2016, May). RTI responses on educational qualifications of Narendra Modi. Reported in The Hindu, The Indian Express, & NDTV.

Election Commission of India. (2014 & 2019). Affidavit filings by candidate Narendra Modi. Retrieved from https://affidavit.eci.gov.in

Indian Railways Archives. (1881). Records of the Mehsana–Vadnagar narrow-gauge line under BB&CI Railway. Western Railway Heritage Section, Mumbai.

Marino, A. (2014). Narendra Modi: A political life. HarperCollins Publishers.

Mukhopadhyay, N. (2013). Narendra Modi: The man, the times. Tranquebar Press.

Ramakrishna Mission Archives. (2014, June). Statement on Narendra Modi’s alleged stay at Belur Math. Reported in The Telegraph and Outlook India.

State Archives of Gujarat. (1974–1975). Records of the Gujarat Navnirman Movement and ABVP participation. Government of Gujarat.

Behind the Curtain: Modi as the De Facto RSS SANGRACHALAK

 

The Hidden Helm: Modi Steering the Sangh

 

The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh has always projected itself as the ideological fountainhead of the Bharatiya Janata Party and the larger Sangh Parivar. At the centre of this structure is the Sarsanghchalak, portrayed as the supreme guide whose word is final. From Dr Keshav Baliram Hedgewar to M S Golwalkar and later Balasaheb Deoras, the Sarsanghchalak was seen as the soul of the movement. Even in recent decades, when the BJP emerged as a national force, Nagpur remained the ideological compass. Yet in today’s India, that compass has been quietly placed in the Prime Minister’s Office. Narendra Modi, once the humble pracharak who took instructions from Nagpur, has become the real Sarsanghchalak. The guru has been reduced to an accessory, while the disciple has claimed the throne.

From mentor to servant

In the past, the RSS called the shots. The Jan Sangh and later the BJP were seen as political instruments of Nagpur. Atal Bihari Vajpayee, despite his moderate image, never ignored the Sangh leadership. L K Advani built his career on the Ram Janmabhoomi movement which was not simply a political strategy but an RSS designed mass mobilisation. The demolition of the Babri Masjid in 1992, for which Advani later expressed regret, was nonetheless carried out by cadres who took their ideological fuel from the Sangh.

Even Vajpayee, whose government came to power in 1998, had to walk a careful line. He sought to pursue a more inclusive political image but Nagpur always had a say in policy debates. The parent organisation could still discipline its political child. This balance of power kept the RSS as the ideological master and BJP as the obedient offspring.

That equilibrium has collapsed in the Modi era.

Modi’s rise and the shift in control

Narendra Modi’s political journey is deeply rooted in the RSS. He joined as a pracharak in the early 1970s and was deputed to the BJP in the 1980s. His rise in Gujarat was backed by the Sangh network. However, once he became Chief Minister after the 2001 earthquake, Modi demonstrated that he was not going to be just another organisational functionary. The 2002 Gujarat riots cemented his image as a strong leader who could survive criticism from both outside and within. Reports suggest that the then Prime Minister Vajpayee wanted him removed, but the RSS defended him. Ironically, that defence helped Modi build a personal power base that eventually outgrew the organisation.

By the time Modi became Prime Minister in 2014, the RSS had invested heavily in his victory. Lakhs of volunteers campaigned tirelessly to bring the BJP to power. Yet once Modi was in office, the direction of influence reversed. Instead of Nagpur guiding Delhi, Delhi began dictating terms to Nagpur.

Examples of RSS sidelining

Several examples underline this transformation. When demonetisation was announced in 2016, the decision was taken in absolute secrecy. Even senior ministers were caught unaware. The RSS, which traditionally prides itself on being part of major ideological and organisational debates, was left as clueless as the common man standing in ATM queues. Still, instead of questioning, the Sangh issued statements of support.

The abrogation of Article 370 in 2019, though long cherished by the Sangh, was executed entirely as a government plan. The RSS played no role in strategy or timing. It was Modi and Amit Shah who scripted and staged the move. The Citizenship Amendment Act too bore the Modi stamp, with the Sangh again reduced to cheerleading rather than guiding.

Even in electoral strategies, it is Modi’s image that dominates. The RSS cadres may do the ground work, but the central figure is the Prime Minister himself. The Sangh has become a campaigning tool rather than the ideological master.

The silencing of veterans

Perhaps the most striking evidence of Modi’s supremacy over the RSS lies in the treatment of senior leaders. L K Advani, once the face of Hindutva politics and the Sangh’s trusted man, was unceremoniously retired from active politics. Murli Manohar Joshi, a lifelong swayamsevak and scholar, was sidelined. Even Nitin Gadkari, widely respected within the RSS and seen as its natural choice for higher leadership, has been made to walk carefully so as not to appear as a rival to Modi.

In earlier times, the RSS would not have allowed such arbitrary sidelining of its veterans. But today, Nagpur accepts what Delhi dictates.

The symbolic power shift

The RSS still holds its annual Vijayadashami gatherings where the Sarsanghchalak delivers a speech. But those speeches are carefully worded to avoid even mild criticism of the government. They sound less like guiding statements and more like endorsements of policy. The once assertive parent has become a polite follower.

In satire, one might say the RSS is no longer the fountainhead of ideology but the fountain pen, signing wherever Modi points. It is no longer the guiding compass but a ceremonial compass rose drawn on a map that Modi has already charted. The guru claps from the audience while the disciple performs on stage.

Consequences of this reversal

This power shift is not a mere matter of internal hierarchy. It carries serious consequences for Indian democracy. The RSS always claimed that it was above day to day politics, that it provided cultural and moral guidance while the BJP handled governance. If that claim was ever true, it is no longer so. Today, the RSS has outsourced its moral compass to one man’s ego.

The organisation remains silent on issues like growing economic inequality, crony capitalism, farmer distress, and unemployment. It raises selective concerns on matters of social harmony but never questions the government in power. Its autonomy has shrunk into irrelevance. Instead of being the conscience keeper of the BJP, it has become a mere echo chamber.

The irony is bitter. The RSS built the BJP brick by brick, using decades of grassroots work. It mobilised generations of volunteers who lived austere lives for the sake of ideology. Yet today, all that discipline and sacrifice serve one individual’s brand. Narendra Modi is not just the Prime Minister; he has become the de facto Sarsanghchalak. The real shakha is no longer in dusty grounds across India but in the Prime Minister’s rallies, his cabinet meetings, and his digital propaganda machinery.

A cautionary tale

The story of the RSS under Modi is a cautionary tale for any organisation that believes it can control its political offspring. Once a creature of Nagpur, the BJP has now domesticated the very hand that fed it. The puppeteer has become the puppet. The cultural parent has been reduced to a ceremonial relative.

History will judge whether this was an inevitable centralisation of power or a betrayal of the Sangh’s original structure. What is clear is that the RSS today plays second fiddle, and its supposed supremacy is a matter of myth rather than fact.

In blunt terms, the real Sarsanghchalak does not sit in Nagpur. He sits in New Delhi, ruling not only as Prime Minister but as the ideological commander of the Sangh itself.

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Author

Advocate Siddhartha Shankar Mishra is a practicing lawyer at the Supreme Court of India and writes on law, politics, and society.

Part 3: Hindutva vs. the Republic – The Legal and Constitutional Implications of the ‘Bharatiya’ Network

 

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Introduction: The Constitution vs. the Cultural Camouflage

India’s Constitution does not merely describe the nation—it defines the Republic. Secularism, equality before law, and freedom of religion are not ornamental ideals but enforceable guarantees under Articles 14, 15, 25–28. Yet, while the framers imagined a plural India, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and its “Bharatiya” network have consistently sought to reimagine India as a Hindu Rashtra. Their strategy is deceptively simple: operate through organisations that wear the mask of “Bharatiya” culture, while pushing a sectarian political agenda. The legal battleground lies in how courts, especially the Supreme Court, have interpreted this tension between culture and religion, democracy and majoritarianism.

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The Constitutional Promise

At the heart of India’s secular vision lies a delicate balance:

• Article 14 & 15: Guarantee equality and non-discrimination.
• Article 25: Freedom of conscience and free profession, practice, and propagation of religion.
• Article 26–28: Autonomy of religious denominations, regulation of secular activities, and ban on state-funded religious instruction.
• Preamble: Declares India to be sovereign, socialist, secular, democratic republic.

This framework doesn’t erase religion but ensures that the State itself is neutral. Yet, neutrality is exactly what the Sangh seeks to dismantle.

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Judicial Crossroads: Supreme Court’s Troubled Tryst with Hindutva

The judiciary has been both the guardian and, at times, the unwitting enabler of Hindutva politics.

1. S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994)
• Landmark ruling affirming secularism as a basic feature of the Constitution.
• State governments pursuing religion-based policies can be dismissed under Article 356.
• This judgment fortified the constitutional shield—but its force would soon be diluted.
2. Ramesh Yeshwant Prabhoo v. Prabhakar Kunte (1996)
• The infamous “Hindutva is a way of life” judgment.
• Justice J.S. Verma held that references to Hindutva/Hinduism are not necessarily communal, but cultural.
• This ambiguity became the Sangh’s legal goldmine, allowing them to drape political Hindutva in the cloak of “Bharatiya culture.”
3. Abhiram Singh v. C.D. Commachen (2017)
• A seven-judge bench barred seeking votes in the name of religion, caste, language, or community.
• However, it did not overturn the 1996 “way of life” precedent—leaving the Sangh with rhetorical breathing space.
4. Other cases like Ramesh (1988) upheld free speech in controversial films, showing that courts will protect artistic critique of communalism, even as they hesitate to fully tackle its political form.

The result: a jurisprudential vacuum. Secularism is declared “basic,” but Hindutva masquerading as culture slips through the cracks.

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The Sangh’s ‘Bharatiya’ Playbook

The RSS has mastered the art of constitutional evasion. Its affiliated organisations rarely brand themselves explicitly “Hindu.” Instead, they adopt the term “Bharatiya”—invoking nationality, not faith.

• Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh (BMS) – labour front.
• Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad (ABVP) – student wing.
• Bharatiya Kisan Sangh (BKS) – farmer front.
• Seva Bharati, Vanvasi Kalyan Ashram, Vishwa Hindu Parishad – outreach under cultural/charitable guise.

Behind this vocabulary of nationhood lies a singular agenda: to embed Hindutva into every institution—labour, education, agriculture, charity, culture—while skirting the constitutional limits on religion in politics.

This camouflage is not accidental but tactical. The courts’ ambiguity allows the Sangh to argue that it is not promoting “religion” but “national culture.”

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The Legal and Democratic Dangers

1. Erosion of Electoral Integrity
• Election campaigns infused with communal slogans are shielded by the “way of life” loophole.
• The constitutional ban on religion in politics is undermined in practice.
2. Minority Rights under Siege
• Article 25 guarantees freedom of conscience to all. Yet, the Sangh’s monopolisation of “Bharatiya” identity excludes Muslims, Christians, Dalits, and even dissenting Hindus.
3. Judicial Inconsistency
• The Supreme Court’s dual stance—affirming secularism while tolerating Hindutva rhetoric—erodes its institutional authority.
• This inconsistency creates space for the Executive to exploit.
4. Redefinition of the Republic
• What begins as semantic play (“Bharatiya” = cultural, not communal) risks transforming India’s legal DNA—from a secular republic into a Hindu majoritarian state.

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Why This Matters Now

The current moment is perilous. With the Sangh’s political arm entrenched in power, the “Bharatiya” camouflage is no longer merely semantic—it is legislative and administrative reality. From education policy to citizenship laws, Hindutva is dressed up as nationalism. Courts are left grappling with whether to enforce the Constitution’s secular command or to allow the slow-motion drift into majoritarianism.

The responsibility lies not only with the judiciary but with civil society, legal scholars, and citizens to demand clarity. The Sangh thrives in ambiguity. The Republic survives only in principle made practice.

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Conclusion: From Ambiguity to Accountability

The battle for India’s future is not fought only in elections but in courtrooms and classrooms, in the language of judgments and the vocabulary of politics. So long as Hindutva hides behind “Bharatiya,” it weaponises culture against the Constitution.

The call to action is clear:

• The judiciary must revisit the “way of life” judgment and draw a firm line between religion and culture.
• Political parties must be held accountable to the secular oath of office.
• Citizens must recognise that “Bharatiya” is not a synonym for Hindu—it is a plural, constitutional identity.

Until then, the Republic remains vulnerable—its secular spine bent under the weight of a borrowed word.

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 Author’s Note

Siddhartha Shankar Mishra is an Advocate at the Supreme Court of India. He writes on law, politics, and society, with a focus on how constitutional ideals are being reshaped by ideological agendas.