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September 29, 2026

From Varna to Caste: A Long and Complicated History

 


Caste is one of the most discussed and misunderstood institutions in Indian society. It is common to trace the entire system to the four varnas mentioned in ancient literature, but the historical reality is considerably more complicated. Varna and jati are not interchangeable terms. Varna was a broad fourfold classification found in ancient texts, while jati came to describe the thousands of communities that developed across different parts of India. The caste system as we know it was the result of a long historical process rather than the creation of a single text, ruler or period.

In the early Vedic period, Indian society was organised around family, tribe, occupation, political authority, religious practice and economic activity. The fourfold varna classification became more visible in later Vedic literature. Brahmins were associated with learning and ritual, Kshatriyas with political and military authority, Vaishyas with agriculture and trade, and Shudras with various forms of labour and service. These categories reflected social distinctions, but they should not simply be equated with the later caste system. 



It is equally difficult to describe the early varna order as completely egalitarian. Differences of status and ritual privilege were present. At the same time, the social boundaries were not necessarily as fixed everywhere as they became in later centuries. Indian literature contains examples of sages, teachers and important figures whose backgrounds do not fit neatly into the rigid caste assumptions of later society. This suggests that ancient Indian social organisation was capable of considerable variation.

The later Dharmashastra tradition attempted to regulate social conduct in greater detail. Texts such as the Manusmriti described duties, marriage rules, occupations and penalties associated with different social categories. Such texts are important historical sources, but they cannot be treated as a single constitution of ancient India. They were normative texts, and actual social practices differed across regions and periods. Other traditions also questioned social hierarchy and ritual authority.

The emergence of jati was a separate and gradual development. As agriculture expanded, settlements became permanent and occupations became specialised, communities developed distinctive identities. Marriage within particular groups became increasingly important. Occupations were frequently transmitted from parents to children. Local political arrangements, land ownership and economic relationships further strengthened these boundaries. Thousands of communities eventually came to occupy particular positions within regional social structures.

Caste therefore cannot be explained by religion alone. Economic interests and control over land mattered. Political patronage mattered. Marriage and kinship mattered. So did ideas of ritual status. In some areas, communities could improve their social position over generations, while in others boundaries remained particularly strong. Indian society was never completely uniform.

The medieval period contributed to the consolidation of caste identities. The growth of kingdoms, landed institutions and temple centred economies created new relationships between rulers, landholders, religious institutions, cultivators and occupational communities. Hereditary occupations and local obligations could make social mobility difficult. Concepts surrounding purity and pollution became increasingly significant in many regions, contributing to the exclusion of communities regarded as outside the accepted social order.

Yet medieval India was also a period of powerful challenges to hierarchy. Buddhist and Jain traditions had questioned Brahmanical ritual authority much earlier, while the Bhakti movements produced poets and saints from a wide variety of social backgrounds. Figures such as Kabir, Ravidas and Chokhamela questioned the assumption that spiritual worth could be determined by birth. These traditions remind us that Indian society has always contained both hierarchy and resistance to hierarchy.

The role of Brahmanical texts also requires a careful examination. It is true that some texts contain prescriptions supporting social hierarchy and restrictions based on birth. But it would be historically inaccurate to assume that every Indian community followed these prescriptions in the same manner. Local customs frequently differed from textual rules. There were also numerous legal, philosophical and religious traditions outside the Dharmashastra literature. The selective use of particular verses to represent the whole of Indian civilisation can therefore produce a distorted picture.

British rule introduced another important stage in the history of caste. The British did not invent caste. Caste based distinctions and hereditary communities clearly existed before colonial rule. However, colonial administration sought to classify Indian society for purposes of governance. The censuses of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries required communities to identify themselves within administrative categories. Officials attempted to arrange an extraordinarily diverse social landscape into fixed classifications.

Colonial ethnographers also relied heavily on Sanskrit texts and Brahmanical interpretations while constructing theories about Indian society. In doing so, they sometimes gave textual descriptions a uniform importance that did not correspond to the enormous diversity of social practice. Census categories, official records and administrative classifications could consequently reinforce identities that had previously been more fluid or locally defined.

The colonial period also witnessed a growing intellectual and political challenge to caste from within Indian society. Social reformers and leaders from oppressed communities questioned both untouchability and hereditary privilege. Jyotirao Phule criticised Brahmanical social domination and worked for the education of marginalised communities. Narayana Guru challenged caste distinctions in Kerala. Mahatma Gandhi campaigned against untouchability, although his approach to the wider question of caste differed from that of other reformers.

Dr B R Ambedkar went considerably further in his criticism of caste. For Ambedkar, caste was not simply a division of labour but a division of people into hereditary groups accompanied by graded inequality. He argued that political democracy could not survive without social democracy. His critique placed dignity, equality and individual liberty at the centre of the debate.

The Constitution of India eventually transformed the legal position. Article 14 guarantees equality before the law and equal protection of the laws. Article 15 prohibits discrimination on specified grounds, including caste, while permitting special provisions for socially and educationally backward classes and other constitutionally recognised groups. Article 16 guarantees equality of opportunity in public employment while permitting reservations under specified conditions. Article 17 goes further by abolishing untouchability and making its enforcement an offence.

The constitutional framework did not pretend that centuries of social inequality would disappear simply because a new law had been enacted. Instead, it sought to change the legal and institutional foundations of that inequality. Reservations, anti discrimination provisions and other protective measures recognise that formal equality alone cannot immediately remove the effects of historical exclusion.

The journey from varna to caste therefore cannot be reduced to one explanation. Ancient classifications, religious ideas, occupation, marriage, land, political power, regional customs, medieval institutions and colonial administration all contributed to the social system that developed over centuries. Nor is it accurate to describe caste simply as an invention of the British or to assume that every aspect of caste can be found fully formed in the Vedic period.

The more useful approach is to understand caste as a historical institution that changed with Indian society itself. It contained hierarchy, but it also generated resistance. It was influenced by religious ideas, but it was also shaped by economics and politics. And while its social legacy continues, the constitutional order has established a different principle: citizenship and legal rights cannot depend upon the circumstances of one's birth.

Author Bio

Siddhartha Shankar Mishra is an Advocate at the Supreme Court of India and a columnist writing on law, politics, society and contemporary issues.

 

 

August 30, 2026

Partition as Strategy Not Destiny

 


Of Slogans and Scapegoats: The Empire’s Last Coup in Partitioning India


When the Union Jack came down from Delhi’s skyline in August 1947, it was celebrated as the triumph of freedom. Yet beneath the jubilation lay the Empire’s most masterful retreat, a meticulously planned division of a nation that could have emerged as the strongest democratic socialist power in Asia. The Partition of India was not only the fallout of communal politics but also the outcome of British strategy, executed through Lord Louis Mountbatten, to fragment a rising socialist India and protect Western interests during the dawn of the Cold War.

The Imperial Exit and the Socialist Anxiety


By 1945 Britain was exhausted from war, its economy broken and colonies restless. Prime Minister Clement Attlee declared that British rule in India would end by June 1948. But when Mountbatten arrived as the last Viceroy in March 1947, he compressed this schedule to a few months. The haste was not accidental. A unified India, led by socialist figures such as Jawaharlal Nehru, Subhas Chandra Bose, and Ram Manohar Lohia, could have become a powerful non Western force potentially sympathetic to the Soviet Union. This was unacceptable to an empire desperate to safeguard its geopolitical influence in Asia.

The British policy thus evolved into divide and depart. The logic was simple, an India fractured along religious lines would be weaker, dependent, and easier to influence than a united socialist republic with a strong industrial and moral foundation.

Gandhi’s Moral Resistance


In this turbulent landscape stood Mahatma Gandhi, the solitary moral voice opposing both Partition and the communal narratives feeding it. Gandhi’s dream was of an undivided India where Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, and others could coexist as equals. He denounced both Savarkar’s theory of Hindutva and Jinnah’s two nation idea, declaring that religion must never define nationality. For him, the essence of India was spiritual pluralism, not sectarian separation.

Gandhi’s opposition to Partition was so absolute that he even proposed that Mohammad Ali Jinnah could be made Prime Minister of a united India if it would prevent division. It was not naivety but an act of moral audacity. He saw Partition as a wound on the soul of the nation and believed no political calculation could justify it. When Congress leaders finally accepted Mountbatten’s plan, Gandhi stood isolated, fasting amid riots and despair, watching the dismemberment of the country he had tried to unite through love.

Savarkar and Jinnah: Two Poles of the Same Divide


While Gandhi preached unity, Vinayak Damodar Savarkar and Mohammad Ali Jinnah embodied the two ideological extremes that made Mountbatten’s task easier. Savarkar’s Hindutva had by the 1930s turned nationalism into a religious identity, defining India as the sacred land of Hindus. He rejected Gandhi’s inclusive nationalism and derided nonviolence as weakness. Jinnah, once a secular nationalist, transformed into the political voice of Muslim separatism, asserting that Hindus and Muslims were distinct nations that could not coexist under one government.

Between Savarkar’s Hindu Rashtra and Jinnah’s Pakistan, the space for Gandhi’s inclusive vision vanished. The British administration found itself presiding over a subcontinent divided by ideas it had once encouraged to maintain control. Mountbatten’s plan capitalised on this polarisation and presented Partition as a practical solution to communal disorder, a solution that conveniently aligned with Britain’s desire for a quick and strategically useful exit.

Mountbatten’s Design and the June 3 Plan


On 3 June 1947 Mountbatten unveiled his plan for transfer of power. It proposed the creation of two dominions, India and Pakistan, the division of Punjab and Bengal, and a right for princely states to accede to either side. The boundary commissions, chaired by Sir Cyril Radcliffe, were given an impossible task, to divide lands and people in weeks, with little knowledge of India’s realities.

Mountbatten’s plan appeared pragmatic, but it was deeply political. By advancing the date of independence to 15 August 1947, he ensured that the British could withdraw before unrest spread further, leaving the consequences of division to local leaders. Congress, under Nehru and Patel, reluctantly accepted the plan, believing refusal would lead to anarchy. The Muslim League embraced it as victory. In truth, both were manoeuvred into agreement on a map drawn in haste and blood.

The Cost of Division


The aftermath was catastrophic. Over fifteen million people crossed borders. Nearly a million perished in massacres, abductions, and forced migrations. Families that had shared streets and songs for centuries turned against one another. Gandhi, heartbroken, moved from one riot torn region to another, preaching peace even as he was accused by both sides of betrayal. His assassination in January 1948 by Nathuram Godse, a follower of Savarkar’s ideology, symbolised the death of the very conscience that had resisted the politics of hate.

Mountbatten, meanwhile, returned to England as the glamorous midwife of freedom, his reputation polished by empire. Yet the line he helped draw not only divided a land but also seeded decades of conflict between India and Pakistan, ensuring the subcontinent remained politically distracted and militarily vulnerable.

Partition and the Cold War Lens


The partitioned subcontinent suited Western interests. Pakistan soon joined Western military alliances such as SEATO and CENTO, providing the West with a strategic foothold near the Soviet border. India, under Nehru’s leadership, pursued non alignment and socialist planning, but its attention was repeatedly drawn to the unresolved issues born from Partition, Kashmir, refugees, and communal politics.

Had India remained united, the socialist bloc in Asia might have found its strongest democratic ally. Instead, the subcontinent became a zone of rivalry and suspicion. Britain exited with its moral image intact while leaving behind an enduring strategic vacuum.

The Forgotten Possibility


History rarely records possibilities, only outcomes. Yet it is worth imagining what Gandhi envisioned, a united, plural, self reliant India guided by conscience rather than creed. Savarkar’s nationalism and Jinnah’s separatism served immediate political ends but destroyed that moral unity. Mountbatten’s plan, hailed as administrative brilliance, was in truth the Empire’s last coup, a calculated fracture that prevented India from rising as one of the great powers in the twentieth century.

The tragedy of Partition is not merely that it divided land and people. It divided ideas, the moral from the political, unity from power, conscience from convenience. Gandhi’s vision was buried under the weight of imperial pragmatism and sectarian ambition.


Conclusion


Partition was not destiny. It was a design. The British Empire, facing decline, found in communal politics a perfect alibi to exit with honour while leaving behind disorder. Gandhi stood against it and paid with his life. Savarkar and Jinnah, in opposing forms, provided the ideological fuel that made Mountbatten’s plan appear inevitable. Nehru and the Congress accepted the division to save what remained of peace. And so, in the summer of 1947, India achieved freedom but lost its wholeness, a freedom born not from triumph but from amputation.

The ghost of that design still walks among us every time religion overshadows citizenship, every time unity is traded for identity. Partition was not just a boundary drawn in 1947. It was the blueprint of our continuing political fragmentation.


About the Author
Siddhartha Shankar Mishra is an Advocate at the Supreme Court of India who writes on law, history, and contemporary politics.
Email:
ssmishra33@gmail.com 


References 


• Britannica: Partition of India
• PMC Journal of Asian Studies: The Political Legacy of Mountbatten’s Plan
• NextIAS and Vajiram & Ravi archives on the Mountbatten Plan 1947
• Unacademy & Vedantu educational archives on Transfer of Power
• Testbook & Britannica analyses on Indian Independence Act 1947
• Speeches and letters of Mahatma Gandhi Collected Works Vol 94 to 98


August 22, 2026

RSS : - FROM SHAKHAS TO STREETS: WHEN IDEOLOGY BECOMES MOBILISATION

 



Riots Are Not Accidents What Official Records, Courts and Commissions Have Said

Communal violence in India is often explained away as emotional overflow or administrative failure. Yet across decades, official commissions, statutory bodies, police records and courts have documented patterns of organised mobilisation, ideological conditioning and political confidence. While criminal law fixes guilt on individuals, institutional and ideological responsibility has been repeatedly recorded by inquiry bodies.

What follows is not opinion. It is a compilation of direct commission quotes, court citations and recorded allegations, presented as part of public record.

 

DIRECT COMMISSION QUOTES

Liberhan Commission (Babri Masjid 1992)

“The demolition of the disputed structure was the result of a concerted and planned action of the Sangh Parivar… including the RSS, VHP and BJP. None of this could have been achieved without the organisational support and mobilisation of these bodies.”

Another key finding:

“The RSS was not a marginal presence. It was central to the planning, coordination and execution of the programme leading to 6 December 1992.”

 

Srikrishna Commission

“There is no doubt that the Shiv Sena and Hindu communal organisations were responsible for the second phase of the riots.”

While RSS was not named as the primary actor, the Commission noted:

“The role of Hindu communal organisations with ideological affinity cannot be ignored in the spread and perpetuation of violence.”

 

Justice D P Madon Commission

“Members of the RSS actively participated in inciting passions and organising Hindu mobs.”

 

Concerned Citizens Tribunal (Justice V R Krishna Iyer)

“The violence was not spontaneous. It was organised, planned and executed with the active participation of Sangh Parivar organisations, including the RSS.”

 

National Human Rights Commission on Gujarat 2002

“There was a systemic failure of the State to protect citizens, and evidence suggests organised groups were allowed to operate with impunity.”

 

SUPREME COURT AND HIGH COURT CASE CITATIONS

Nathuram Godse Background

Gopal Godse v Union of India, Bombay HC (1961)
Court noted ideological proximity of Gandhi’s assassins with Hindu extremist thought, though not convicting RSS as an institution.

This judicial observation recognised ideological radicalisation even while fixing criminal guilt only on individuals.

 

Babri Masjid Cases

M S Golwalkar v Union of India is not a case
Relevant cases are:

• Dr M Ismail Faruqui v Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 360
• CBI v Kalyan Singh, (2017) 7 SCC 444
• L K Advani v CBI, (2017) 7 SCC 453

The Supreme Court acknowledged organised mobilisation leading to demolition.

In CBI v Kalyan Singh and L K Advani v CBI, the Court restored conspiracy charges and rejected the argument that demolition occurred due to sudden emotional frenzy or administrative helplessness.

 

 

Gujarat 2002

National Human Rights Commission v State of Gujarat, (2009) 6 SCC 767

The Supreme Court described Gujarat riots as a case of “modern day Neros” watching while people burned.

The Court transferred trials outside Gujarat, citing failure of rule of law and risk to fair trial.

 

Delhi Riots 2020

State of NCT of Delhi v Tahir Hussain, Delhi HC 2021

Court discussed organised mobilisation and conspiracy, while emphasising individual criminal liability.

While trials are ongoing, judicial observations again rejected protest gone wrong explanations in certain areas.

 

KEY INCIDENTS AND ALLEGATIONS

1. Mahatma Gandhi Assassination

After Gandhi’s assassination, the Government of India banned the RSS. Home Ministry records cited a climate of hatred and militant propaganda.
While Nathuram Godse had left RSS formally, the Kapoor Commission later recorded ideological proximity.

 

2. Jabalpur Riots

Justice D P Madon Commission observed organised mobilisation and role of Hindu communal groups, including RSS workers, in inciting violence.

 

3. Meerut Riots

Fact finding reports documented coordinated rumour spreading and mobilisation by Hindu and Muslim organisations. RSS linked outfits were named among Hindu groups active on the ground.

 

 

4. Babri Masjid Demolition

The Liberhan Commission squarely blamed the RSS, VHP, BJP leadership for systematic planning and mobilisation leading to demolition and nationwide riots.

 

5. Mumbai Riots

The Srikrishna Commission found that Shiv Sena and Hindu communal organisations, with ideological overlap with Sangh Parivar, played a leading role in violence.

 

6. Gujarat Riots

The Concerned Citizens Tribunal, NHRC, and several journalists recorded RSS shakhas and VHP networks being used for logistics, mobilisation, and targeting.
Courts convicted individuals but not the organisation.

 

7. Muzaffarnagar Riots

Police records and media reports noted organised mobilisation, provocative speeches, and circulation of fake videos by Hindu nationalist groups linked to the Sangh ecosystem.

 

8. Delhi Riots

Independent investigations and charge sheets alleged ideological mobilisation and street level coordination by individuals associated with Hindu nationalist groups. Cases remain contested in courts.

 

LEGAL POSITION CLARIFIED

No Indian court has convicted RSS as an organisation
Multiple commissions have recorded its ideological and organisational role
Criminal law fixes individual guilt, not ideological guilt
Commissions expose patterns that courts cannot ignore but are not punitive

This distinction is fundamental to understanding how institutional accountability escapes judicial punishment while remaining documented in public record.

 

 

WHY DENIAL FAILS

Organisations routinely rely on technical legality to deny responsibility. But constitutional morality is not limited to courtroom acquittals. When ideological ecosystems repeatedly appear across decades of violence, denial becomes political strategy rather than factual rebuttal.

Silence after riots, absence of internal disciplinary processes, and political rehabilitation of accused individuals convert plausible deniability into moral endorsement.

Courts punish crimes. History judges systems.

 

CONCLUSION

From Gandhi’s assassination to Delhi 2020, official records repeatedly challenge the myth of spontaneous riots. They document organised mobilisation, ideological conditioning, political silence and confidence of impunity.

No Indian court has convicted RSS as an organisation
Multiple commissions have recorded its ideological and organisational role
Criminal law fixes individual guilt, not ideological guilt
Commissions expose patterns that courts cannot ignore but are not punitive

Denial does not erase this record.
Legal acquittal does not mean moral innocence.
History will not read only judgments. It will read patterns.

Accountability is not hatred. It is democracy’s last defence.

 

REFERENCES

Commissions and Tribunals

  1. Liberhan Commission of Inquiry Report (2009), Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liberhan_Commission
  2. Justice B N Srikrishna Commission Report (1998), Government of Maharashtra
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Srikrishna_Commission
  3. Justice D P Madon Commission Report (1962), Government of Madhya Pradesh
    https://www.mha.gov.in/en/documents/commissions-inquiry
  4. Concerned Citizens Tribunal on Gujarat 2002, Crime Against Humanity, chaired by Justice V R Krishna Iyer
    https://cjp.org.in/concerned-citizens-tribunal/
  5. National Human Rights Commission Proceedings on Gujarat Riots (2002)
    https://nhrc.nic.in/

Supreme Court and High Court Judgments

  1. Gopal Godse v Union of India, Bombay High Court, 1961
    https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1783372/
  2. Dr M Ismail Faruqui v Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 360
    https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1570821/
  3. CBI v Kalyan Singh, (2017) 7 SCC 444
    https://indiankanoon.org/doc/196014248/
  4. L K Advani v CBI, (2017) 7 SCC 453
    https://indiankanoon.org/doc/100876344/
  5. National Human Rights Commission v State of Gujarat, (2009) 6 SCC 767
    https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1858682/
  6. State of NCT of Delhi v Tahir Hussain, Delhi High Court, 2021
    https://indiankanoon.org/doc/138984876/

 

Historical Inquiry

  1. Justice J L Kapur Commission Report on Gandhi Assassination (1969)
    https://www.mha.gov.in/en/documents/gandhi-assassination-report

 

Author’s Introduction

Siddhartha Shankar Mishra is an advocate at the Supreme Court of India and a commentator on law, politics and society. His writings blend legal insight with social critique and aim to provoke reflection on power, justice and public conscience.

 

August 15, 2026

RSS and the Indian National Flag: History, Ideology and the Continuing Controversy - Part II

 



Did Nehru Prevent the RSS from Hoisting the Tricolour?

One of the most common arguments advanced by RSS supporters is that before 2002 private organisations were not permitted to hoist the National Flag, and therefore the RSS cannot be criticised for not displaying the Tricolour at its headquarters. Some political narratives go a step further by suggesting that Jawaharlal Nehru's government prevented the RSS from hoisting the National Flag.

The historical record, however, does not support this claim.

Before 2002, the display of the National Flag was indeed regulated by executive instructions contained in the Flag Code of India. These rules limited the unrestricted daily display of the National Flag by private citizens and organisations. However, they did not prohibit patriotic observance of Independence Day or Republic Day, nor did they prevent any organisation from recognising or respecting the National Flag adopted by the Constituent Assembly.

More importantly, the controversy surrounding the RSS is not fundamentally about the legal ability to hoist the Tricolour. It concerns the organisation's own published ideological writings during the years immediately following Independence.

No documentary evidence has been produced to show that Jawaharlal Nehru specifically prohibited the RSS from hoisting the National Flag. The criticism contained in the Organiser editorial of 14 August 1947 and Golwalkar's later writings preceded subsequent political explanations and therefore constitute primary historical evidence.

RSS Headquarters and the Tricolour

Historical records indicate that the National Flag was hoisted at the RSS headquarters in Nagpur on 15 August 1947 and 26 January 1950. Thereafter, it was not routinely hoisted for many decades until 26 January 2002.

Critics argue that this long absence reflected the organisation's ideological preference for the Bhagwa Dhwaj.

The RSS disputes this interpretation. It maintains that the Bhagwa Dhwaj has always been its organisational symbol while the Tricolour is the National Flag deserving of full respect. According to RSS leaders, the controversy has been exaggerated by political opponents and ignores the legal framework that governed display of the National Flag before 2002.

The truth is that both facts can coexist. The legal restrictions existed. Equally, the documented criticism of the Tricolour by early RSS publications also existed. Serious historical analysis requires acknowledging both rather than selectively accepting one and ignoring the other.

The Naveen Jindal Judgment

A significant legal development occurred in Union of India v. Naveen Jindal (2004).

The Supreme Court held that flying the National Flag with dignity and respect forms part of the freedom of expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution, subject to reasonable restrictions and compliance with the Flag Code.

The judgment affirmed that the National Flag belongs to every citizen and is not the exclusive property of the State.

The Government subsequently liberalised the Flag Code, making it easier for citizens and private organisations to display the National Flag throughout the year while maintaining dignity and respect.

Although this judgment changed the legal position regarding everyday display of the Tricolour, it did not alter the historical record concerning debates that occurred in 1947.

The RSS Today

The RSS today publicly declares its respect for the Indian National Flag and the Constitution. It has actively participated in national campaigns such as Har Ghar Tiranga and has repeatedly stated that the Bhagwa Dhwaj is a cultural and organisational symbol rather than a substitute for the National Flag.

This represents the organisation's present position.

However, historical scholarship distinguishes between contemporary positions and historical evidence. The writings published in 1947 and Golwalkar's observations remain part of India's documented political history. A change in position over time does not erase earlier ideological debates.

History Should Not Be Selective

The controversy surrounding the RSS and the National Flag illustrates a broader principle.

History cannot be rewritten according to present political convenience.

If an organisation evolves, that evolution should be acknowledged. Likewise, its earlier positions should neither be denied nor forgotten.

The documentary evidence demonstrates that important voices within the RSS expressed dissatisfaction with the Tricolour during the formative years of the Republic. At the same time, the RSS today accepts and publicly honours the National Flag.

Both facts belong to history.

A mature democracy should be confident enough to confront historical disagreements without distortion. Patriotism is strengthened not by suppressing evidence but by engaging honestly with it.

The National Flag belongs equally to every Indian regardless of ideology, religion or political affiliation. It derives its legitimacy not from any organisation but from the Constitution and the collective will of the people expressed through the Constituent Assembly.

 

Footnotes and References

·  Constituent Assembly Debates (22 July 1947) – adoption of the National Flag.

·  Organiser, 14 August 1947 – the editorial on the Tricolour.

·  M. S. Golwalkar, Bunch of Thoughts – relevant passages on the National Flag and the Bhagwa Dhwaj.

·  M. S. Golwalkar, Shri Guruji Samagra Darshan (where relevant).

·  Flag Code of India (pre-2002 and post-2002).

·  Union of India v. Naveen Jindal, (2004) 2 SCC 510.

·  Constituent Assembly Debates on the National Flag Resolution.

·  MHA notifications on amendments to the Flag Code.

 About the Author

Adv. Siddhartha Shankar Mishra is an Advocate, Supreme Court of India, columnist and freelance writer.