Pages

Powered By Blogger

June 19, 2025

Ctrl+Alt+Sangh: Rebooting India Through Digital Hate

 




In the age of digital democracy, political power is as much about perception as it is about policy. No party in India has understood—and exploited—this reality better than the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). At the centre of its electoral juggernaut lies a carefully engineered, tightly coordinated, and ideologically committed force: the BJP/RSS IT Cell.

The hypothesis that dismantling this IT infrastructure could destabilize or even "finish" the BJP is not merely a provocation—it invites a deeper examination of how information ecosystems, online propaganda, and narrative warfare have reshaped Indian politics. To understand the extent of this digital grip, one must dissect the genesis, functioning, and impact of this formidable machinery.

The BJP IT Cell was founded in 2007 by Prodyut Bora. During the campaign for the 2004 Indian general election, the BJP had already promoted the India Shining slogan and used around 5% of its campaign budget on texts and pre-recorded phone calls to reach voters. The BJP orchestrates online campaigns through its social media cell to intimidate perceived government critics. Sadhavi Khosla, https://caravanmagazine.in/vantage/sadhavi-khosla-bjp-social-media-trolls a BJP cyber-volunteer in the BJP IT Cell, said that the organisation disseminated misogyny, Islamophobia and hatred. The network of volunteers of BJP take instructions from the BJP IT Cell and two affiliated organisations to troll users who are critical of the BJP. Journalists and Indian film actors are also among their targets.

Swati Chaturvedi’s explosive book I Am a Troll pulls back the curtain on this digital war room. Drawing on firsthand testimony, it exposes how Hindutva’s digital foot soldiers manufacture consent, silence dissent, and spread venom under the veneer of patriotism. The book offers rare insight into the coordinated machinery behind the façade of spontaneous online support, revealing the orchestrated hypocrisy behind self-proclaimed nationalist trolling.



In November 2015, Aamir Khan, an Indian Muslim actor, expressed concern about rising intolerance in India in response to political events that included violent attacks against Muslims and intellectuals, and the absence of swift or strong condemnation from the country's ruling BJP government. Khosla said that BJP responded with an online campaign through its social media cell to intimidate Khan. Modi supporters bombarded the company where Khan was spokesperson with orders and later cancelled them, resulting in the company distancing itself from Khan, though a planned boycott of his film Dangal by BJP supporters proved unsuccessful. Derek O'Brien, a member of Parliament, raised the topic of online hate in the Rajya Sabha. He questioned why Narendra Modi followed cyber-bullies on social media and said, "We are mainstreaming hate". He also asked if the Modi administration would issue an advisory asking government officials to stop following Twitter users that regularly send abusive messages and obscenities. The government did not respond to this request.

In December 2020, Twitter took restrictive action against Amit Malviya, IT Cell in charge, and tagged his posts as 'manipulated media'. This was the first time Twitter took restrictive action against an Indian political personality. Malviya had posted an edited video of an incident from the 2020–2021 Indian farmers' protest that violated Twitter policy towards fighting the spread of doctored media.

An investigation by the Indian media watchdog Newslaundry revealed the organisational structure of the IT Cell: The state IT cell has 25 members in the core team with Rai as its head. Each regional centre had 20 members and a team of 15 handled IT at each of the 92 districts. Seven-member teams worked at the block levels. At the regional, district and Assembly level, BJP had approximately 5,000 workers. A separate team of 20 professionals – including technicians, designers, and cartoonists – created the desired content for the party.

JPS Rathore, a member of the UP-BJP's IT Cell described the motives of the organisation as follows:

"Our aim was to capture the mind of the voter. To message them night and day. Whenever they look, they should see us, hear our message. (Humari rajniti thi ki chunav ke pehle voter ke dimag ko capture kar lo. Subeh–shaam message bhejo. Jab dekhe, humara chehra dekhe, humari baat sune)."

The BJP’s IT Cell is not a conventional public relations team. It is a hybrid of a media company, a political war room, a troll factory, and a propaganda engine. Staffed by full-time professionals and supported by an army of volunteers and sympathizers, the IT Cell is organized in a hierarchical fashion—much like a paramilitary force. Every message, meme, and talking point is part of a broader narrative strategy.

From the national headquarters in Delhi to WhatsApp groups at the booth level, the digital operations of the BJP are both top-down and hyper-local. They deploy micro-targeting techniques using voter data, behavioral analytics, and caste/religious demographics to tailor their content to specific audiences. This is not just communication—this is psychological warfare.

Speed is everything in digital politics. The IT Cell specializes in flooding platforms with content the moment a controversy breaks. While the opposition drafts a press release, the BJP's ecosystem already has a dozen memes, hashtags, and viral videos in circulation. These are amplified by influencers, fake accounts, bots, and media channels aligned with the ruling ideology.

The emphasis is not on truth but on traction. A lie that trends becomes a truth in perception. By the time it is fact-checked, it has already served its purpose.

The BJP’s digital strategy transcends mere storytelling. It is about defining what counts as reality. Whether it's rewriting historical narratives, distorting opposition statements, or creating fear about minorities, the IT Cell manufactures consent and outrage with industrial efficiency. WhatsApp forwards that mix half-truths with communal innuendo have become a key mode of voter persuasion in rural India.

The cumulative effect is toxic: polarization, disinformation, and an erosion of trust in journalism, institutions, and even science. Critics are routinely targeted through doxxing, trolling, or worse—often backed by semi-official dog whistles.

No political figure has benefited more from digital myth-making than Narendra Modi. The IT Cell has elevated him from a regional leader to a cult-like global statesman. His image—carefully curated, selectively photographed, and algorithmically promoted—is the crown jewel of the BJP’s digital empire.

Criticism of Modi is not treated as political disagreement but as heresy. This deification, enabled by relentless digital campaigning, has created a leader beyond reproach—a dangerous condition in any democracy.

Elections in India today are as much about mobilizing narratives as mobilizing voters. The BJP’s IT Cell has played a crucial role in shaping the outcome of almost every major election in the last decade—from Uttar Pradesh and Bihar to Assam and Karnataka.

The key lies in narrative control. Whether it's invoking nationalism after Balakot, spinning economic data post-demonetization, or justifying lockdown chaos during COVID-19, the IT Cell has turned crisis into opportunity through rapid reframing.

Would the BJP collapse if its IT Cell were dismantled? Not instantly. The party has deep-rooted ideological bases, a strong organizational network (the RSS), and powerful funders. But it would lose its greatest strategic advantage: the ability to control perception in real time.

In a post-IT Cell landscape, the BJP would have to confront unfiltered public opinion, media scrutiny, and grassroots backlash without the shield of curated narratives. Opposition voices would regain space. Independent journalism could flourish. Civil society would breathe freer.

In short, the party would have to do politics the old-fashioned way: with accountability.

The conversation is not merely about one party. The BJP's IT Cell is the model now being emulated by regional parties, corporate lobbies, and even foreign actors. It represents the broader crisis of digital democracy: where the speed of lies outpaces the slowness of truth.

To destroy the BJP’s IT Cell is not to silence a party, but to dismantle a machine that has subverted democratic deliberation. It is to restore balance to a public sphere overwhelmed by hate, hyperbole, and half-truths.

Every empire has its Achilles' heel. For the BJP, it is its digital invincibility. Strip away the algorithms, expose the misinformation, and the party is forced to stand on the merit of its policies and the integrity of its governance.

This is not a call for censorship but for civic resistance—a pushback against a weaponized narrative industry. Until then, the BJP's IT Cell remains its greatest asset—and Indian democracy's most urgent challenge.

In the digital age, the BJP’s IT Cell operates as the nerve centre of its political power—crafting narratives, spreading disinformation, and weaponizing social media to manufacture consent and crush dissent. From micro-targeted propaganda to coordinated trolling armies, this machinery distorts reality, fuels polarization, and elevates a cult-like mythology around Narendra Modi. While deeply rooted in organizational strength, the BJP’s strategic dominance hinges on controlling perception online. Exposing and dismantling this network is essential not just to challenge one party, but to reclaim the integrity of Indian democracy itself.

The BJP’s digital war room is more than just a campaign tool—it’s the algorithmic fortress that shields a fragile political empire built on curated myths and manufactured outrage. To unplug this machine is not to silence a voice but to revive a democratic discourse smothered under waves of digital deceit. Until then, the IT Cell remains the Sangh’s most lethal weapon, rewriting India’s narrative with a click and a troll. It’s time for citizens, journalists, and institutions to reboot their resistance—not with censorship, but with relentless fact, fearless accountability, and unyielding truth. Because in the kingdom of digital hate, only an awakened electorate can break the code.


About the Author

Siddhartha Shankar Mishra is an Advocate at the Supreme Court of India. He writes on law, politics, and society with a voice that blends satire and truth.

May 28, 2025

The Patriot Who Knelt: Savarkar’s Journey from Revolutionary Icon to Ideological Revisionist

 




Once a firebrand who preached revolution, Savarkar’s real legacy may lie not in resistance—but in revision, retreat, and a loyalty for hire.


I. Prologue in Chains: The Revolutionary at the Gallows’ Edge

In the early 20th century, the name Vinayak Damodar Savarkar stirred both admiration and apprehension among the colonial authorities. A young barrister with a razor-sharp intellect and incendiary prose, Savarkar authored The First War of Indian Independence, 1857, a bold reinterpretation of the Sepoy Mutiny that recast the uprising as a pan-Indian revolution—a joint resistance by Hindus and Muslims against British rule. It was a vision of unity born out of shared suffering, a plea to forge nationalism from common trauma.

This book, banned even before it reached Indian shores, catapulted Savarkar to a cult status among militant nationalists. In London, he founded the Free India Society. In Bombay, he inspired secret societies of armed youth. When he was arrested for his involvement in revolutionary activities and transported to the Andaman Cellular Jail in 1911, it was not as a mere dissident—it was as a symbol of uncompromising resistance.

But symbols crack under pressure. And for Savarkar, the prison cell proved not just a crucible of punishment but one of profound transformation—and calculated recalibration.


II. Petitions from the Pit: The Price of Survival

In June 1911, scarcely a month after his arrival in Cellular Jail, Savarkar submitted his first mercy petition to the British government. The revolutionary who had once urged Indians to “burn down British flags” now pleaded for leniency. That appeal, ignored, would soon be followed by others. In 1913, his second mercy petition shed all ideological defiance, replacing it with grievances about prison classifications, comparisons with fellow convicts, and, crucially, declarations of political rebirth:

“[I]f the government in their manifold beneficence and mercy release me, I for one cannot but be the staunchest advocate of… loyalty to the English government.”

The shift was not merely rhetorical. It was strategic. Savarkar framed himself not only as a reformed man but as a valuable asset—one who could bring wayward revolutionaries back into the constitutional fold. His pitch was clear: Convert me, and I will convert others.

This was not so much a surrender as it was a sale. And his price? Redemption through rehabilitation, in exchange for repudiation of revolt.


III. From Empire’s Enemy to Nation’s Divider

When Savarkar was finally released in stages—first under surveillance and then gradually integrated back into public life—it was not the same man who had entered the colonial dungeons. The post-prison Savarkar did not return to a struggle against imperialism. Instead, he trained his intellectual arsenal on a new set of internal enemies: Muslims, Gandhians, Congressmen, and anyone who threatened the hegemony of his idea of a Hindu nation.

This ideological evolution culminated in his articulation of Hindutva—a term he deliberately distinguished from mere Hinduism. In his 1923 pamphlet Hindutva: Who is a Hindu?, Savarkar proposed a cultural, ethnic, and territorial identity in which true Indianness was inseparable from being Hindu by race, culture, and land. Muslims and Christians, regardless of how many generations they had lived in India, were foreign unless they acknowledged India as both Pitrubhumi (fatherland) and Punyabhumi (holy land). Thus, belonging became conditional—and nationalism, exclusionary.

Ironically, the man who once championed inter-caste marriages to unify Hindus under one political roof now stood vehemently against inter-religious unions. In his view, such marriages were not bridges but threats—dilutions of cultural purity. Social reform was permissible, even desirable, but only if it reinforced Hindutva’s internal cohesion, not if it fostered pluralism.


IV. The Darkest Doctrine: Justifying the Unjustifiable

Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of Savarkar’s later thought was his moral descent into what can only be called ideological barbarism. In his retellings of historical grievances—particularly regarding Muslim rulers—he moved beyond critique into advocacy of vengeance. At his most extreme, Savarkar justified rape as a tool of political retribution, especially during war or historical redress. For a man who once argued for India's moral elevation above colonial brutality, this was a descent into the abyss.

This rhetorical violence was not just theoretical. In the climate of the 1940s, with partition looming, such ideas fanned the flames of hatred and suspicion. Although Savarkar was acquitted in the Gandhi assassination trial, his ideological fingerprints were unmistakable in the atmosphere of hatred that made Gandhi’s murder thinkable.


V. Legacy in Dispute: Freedom Fighter or Proto-Fascist?

Savarkar's defenders continue to present him as a misunderstood patriot—one who pragmatically adjusted his strategy to survive and serve. They hail his promotion of scientific temper, abolition of untouchability, and support for women's rights (again, within limits). Yet even these claims must be weighed against the ideological rigidity that underpinned them. His social reforms were never universalist—they were instrumental, designed to fortify a Hindu identity that excluded more than it embraced.

His critics, on the other hand, see in Savarkar a cautionary figure: a revolutionary who, when broken by empire, turned to mimic its tools—division, hierarchy, and state violence—to shape a new dominion of his own.


VI. Conclusion: The Prison That Never Opened

The irony of Savarkar’s life is that while he was physically released from the Cellular Jail, he remained mentally confined within the walls of vengeance, purity, and exclusion. The real prison was not made of brick or iron—but of an ideology that mistook grievance for vision, and retribution for justice.

From lion to lapdog, from rebel to reactionary—Savarkar’s journey is not just the story of a man, but a mirror held up to the soul of a nation still debating what freedom really means, and for whom.


About the Author

Siddhartha Mishra is an Advocate at the Supreme Court of India. His writing focuses on the intersection of law, history, and political thought. He can be reached at ssmishra33@gmail.com.

May 20, 2025

The Business of Belief: How Faith, Nationalism, and Welfare Were Rebranded for Power

 


The RSS today looks less like a cultural organisation and more like a Brahmin-Baniya club that knows how to sell ideas like goods in a market. Over the last decade, it has perfected the art of packaging ideology with the finesse of a corporate campaign. Words like “Bharatiya”, “Hindutva”, and even the sacred name of Lord Ram have been turned into political commodities—marketed with emotional appeal, devoid of spiritual depth, and served with electoral intent. Faith has become a business model, and government schemes are sold with a religious sticker on them.

Many of these schemes, ironically, were conceived during Congress regimes but have been rebranded under glossy saffron labels. Initiatives for financial inclusion, rural housing, and public health have been remarketed with catchy slogans like #ModiHaiTohMumkinHai and Sabka Saath, Sabka Vikas—often with minor tweaks and maximum media mileage. The difference? Congress lacked marketing; the BJP mastered it. Wrapped in a saffron version of Bharatiyata, these repackaged schemes are designed to touch the emotional nerves of a largely unsuspecting population, turning governance into spectacle.

The Constitution guarantees freedom of religion—not its franchising. But that distinction is being deliberately erased. In today’s India, beliefs are marketed like brands, governance is sold like faith, and nationalism is peddled like a loyalty subscription. The BJP IT cell, meanwhile, has done a phenomenal job manufacturing and spreading narratives laced with nationalism, creating a digital universe where they are the only patriots and everyone else is conveniently labelled anti-national.

But marketing alone doesn’t move mountains. What makes this political rebranding so effective is the carefully constructed echo chamber that sustains it. A large section of the mainstream media has shed its role as the fourth estate and become the extended PR arm of the ruling dispensation. Prime-time news is no longer about facts or holding power accountable. It has become a circus of manufactured outrage, where anchors shout down dissenters and amplify distraction. While joblessness, inflation, and agrarian distress silently deepen, our television screens remain lit with debates on temples, films, and communal flashpoints.

This sustained diversion would not be possible without the passive complicity—or active abdication—of institutions meant to uphold constitutional order. The judiciary, once revered as the last refuge of the common citizen, now walks a delicate line between caution and calculated delay. Petitions concerning civil liberties, electoral malpractices, and democratic rights linger in cold storage, while cases that suit political interests are heard with lightning speed. The once-mighty Supreme Court now risks appearing selective, if not submissive.

The Election Commission, constitutionally mandated to ensure free and fair elections, too appears increasingly uneven in its scrutiny. While opposition leaders are often reprimanded for minor code violations, blatant breaches by ruling party figures are either ignored or brushed aside. The neutrality that once lent credibility to our democratic process now appears compromised by convenience.

This slow institutional drift has had a chilling effect on civil society. Voices of dissent are not just discredited—they are criminalised. Journalists, students, activists, and even comedians are hounded for questioning the state. The line between criticism and sedition has blurred. In such a climate, even silence becomes an act of resistance.

And then there are the voters—the ordinary citizens whose emotions are constantly manipulated by appeals to religion, caste, and nationalism. It’s not that the public is unaware; it’s that the noise is too loud, the propaganda too persistent, and the choices too narrow. When every election is framed as a battle for civilisation, it becomes harder to speak of roads, schools, or jobs. The voter is offered mythology, not manifesto.

India is not just being governed—it is being marketed. Faith, governance, and identity have all been brought under a single brand strategy. The real danger isn’t just the misuse of religion for politics, but the normalisation of it. When belief becomes business, and business becomes ballot, democracy loses both its meaning and its soul.

In times like these, the citizen must remain alert, not just to what is being said—but to how it's being sold.


About the Author:

Siddhartha Mishra is an Advocate at the Supreme Court of India. He writes on law, politics, and society with a focus on constitutional values, civil liberties, and the misuse of power. He believes that satire is not a style—but a form of resistance.

Email : - ssmishra33@gmail.com

May 03, 2025

Democracy Doesn’t Need a Chest Size—It Needs a Backbone

 


 


In today’s political climate, symbolism often overshadows substance. In India, few symbols have captured the public imagination more starkly than the metaphor of the “56-inch chest.” Once uttered to convey strength, resolve, and nationalistic pride, it has since become the emblem of a political era defined by hyper-masculinity and performative governance. But a closer look reveals an unsettling paradox: this display of muscular nationalism is not fortifying India’s democracy—it’s hollowing it out from within.

The "strongman" image has long been a tool in global politics, from Vladimir Putin's shirtless horseback photos to Donald Trump’s bluster. In India, it has evolved into a strategic political narrative where strength is equated with authoritarian control, emotional nationalism, and a disdain for dissent. The result is a version of leadership that substitutes depth with drama, and courage with chest-thumping—an illusion of power, rather than its responsible exercise.

What’s at stake isn’t just optics; it’s the health of India’s democracy.

The Cult of the Individual Over the Constitution

Democracies are built not on personalities, but on institutions. The power of a democratic system lies in the separation of powers, the checks and balances between branches of government, and the autonomy of institutions that are meant to safeguard the rights of citizens. But strongman politics disrupts this balance. It redirects attention and authority away from institutional frameworks and toward a single individual portrayed as the savior of the nation.

This over-centralization of power is visible in how India’s key institutions have increasingly bent to the will of the executive. Judicial appointments have raised concerns about independence, media organizations frequently self-censor or toe the government line, and even election oversight bodies have faced accusations of bias. The erosion is subtle, but constant. Over time, institutions that once served the Constitution begin serving the image of a leader—and that shift is devastating to democratic integrity.

A leader with real democratic backbone empowers institutions, encourages decentralization, and values institutional memory and continuity over personal credit. Instead, we see power consolidated, bureaucracies politicized, and a narrative where critique is seen as betrayal rather than civic responsibility.

 

Dissent as a Threat

The most damning characteristic of strongman politics is its allergy to dissent. Democracies thrive on disagreement. Diverse opinions, lively debates, and the right to question authority are not flaws—they are the system working as intended. But when criticism is equated with sedition, and disagreement is labeled “anti-national,” the room for democratic dialogue shrinks dramatically.

Over the past few years, we’ve witnessed journalists jailed for doing their jobs, students arrested for expressing political views, and activists silenced under vague or outdated legal provisions. Protest movements, from anti-CAA demonstrations to farmers’ agitations, have been met not with engagement, but with force, propaganda, and vilification. The language of nationalism has been weaponized—not to unite, but to silence.

This dangerous equation—where loyalty to a party or leader is conflated with loyalty to the nation—undermines the very freedoms a democracy promises. Dissent isn’t dangerous; suppressing it is.

Majoritarianism Wearing the Mask of Democracy

At the heart of democracy lies representation. Every citizen, regardless of religion, caste, gender, or region, must feel seen, heard, and protected. Yet, the strongman model thrives not on inclusivity, but on division. It courts the majority while subtly (and sometimes overtly) demonizing minorities and marginalized groups.

Policies are framed in the language of security and tradition, but their impact often disproportionately affects communities that already face systemic disadvantages. Whether it’s through the restructuring of citizenship laws, the criminalization of interfaith marriages, or the silence around hate crimes and mob violence, the message is clear: democracy is being reshaped to serve the few, not the many.

This brand of nationalism pretends to protect cultural values but instead weaponizes identity to manufacture political consensus. It offers unity through exclusion—and in doing so, chips away at the pluralism that has long been India’s strength.

The Smokescreen of Emotional Nationalism

Strongman politics thrives on spectacle. It feeds on emotional nationalism, turning elections into theatres of passion rather than spaces for reasoned deliberation. Rallies are filled with slogans, not policy. News cycles revolve around symbolic gestures, not governance metrics.

Meanwhile, critical issues—rising unemployment, rural distress, inflation, a struggling education system, and a fragile healthcare infrastructure—are sidelined or spun through nationalist narratives. The opposition is mocked or dismissed rather than debated. Media coverage focuses more on optics—what the leader wore, where they traveled, who they greeted—than on outcomes and performance.

It’s governance by distraction. And the costs are real. In a country with the world’s largest youth population, real strength would mean equipping them with opportunities, not empty rhetoric.

 

Where Is the Strength When It’s Needed Most?

Perhaps nowhere is the gap between posturing and performance more obvious than in matters of national security. While fiery speeches and aggressive slogans are common in domestic political rallies, they often vanish when confronting real external threats.

Take, for instance, the troubling developments along India’s northeastern border. As reported by The Tribune (Jan 2023) and The New York Times (Dec 2022), China has built nearly 90 villages in disputed areas near Arunachal Pradesh—an encroachment with massive geopolitical implications. Yet the government’s response has been one of near-total silence. No parliamentary debate. No public strategy. No accountability.

While drums of patriotism beat at home, key foreign policy questions go unanswered. The strongman’s silence in the face of such challenges is not a sign of strategic restraint—it’s a failure to act with the transparency and urgency that democratic governance demands.

Where is the “56-inch chest” when every inch of Indian land is under threat?

What India Truly Needs

It’s time to move past theatrics and ask: what kind of leadership does India truly need?

India needs a leader who understands that real strength lies not in dominating opposition, but in listening to it. A leader who sees institutions as pillars of democracy, not as personal tools. A leader who does not stoke identity-based divisions to win votes, but brings communities together with a shared vision.

Most importantly, India needs a leader who rises above party lines and beyond communal politics—a leader who governs with empathy, strategy, and courage rooted in constitutional values rather than charisma.

This kind of leadership doesn’t require a metaphorical chest size. It requires a backbone.

Conclusion: The Illusion of Strength Is Not Strength

The allure of strongman politics lies in its simplicity. It offers certainty in uncertain times, heroes instead of complexity, slogans instead of policy. But democracy is not meant to be simple. It is messy, noisy, and participatory. And that’s what makes it beautiful—and powerful.

Democracy doesn’t demand blind loyalty; it demands critical thinking. It doesn’t ask for theatrical strength; it asks for moral and institutional courage. It doesn’t want silence in the face of aggression—it needs truth, action, and leadership that’s rooted in principle.

The illusion of the strongman may win elections. But it cannot build a future.

India must decide: do we want a democracy built on bravado, or one built on backbone?

 

Siddhartha Mishra

(The author is an advocate at Supreme Court of India )

Email : - ssmishra33@gmail.com

November 25, 2016

The India-Pakistan Imbroglio – Surgical Strike





The India-Pakistan Imbroglio – Surgical Strike

It like two brothers fighting for a piece of land born out of the same womb. Divided into countries due to the vested interests of the leaders of the bygone. If it is international than it is at home too. Are we aware? It is in our sub consciousness.

Indian army carried out, “surgical strike “on Thursday on 29th Sep. The surgical strike was meant to eliminate the terrorist camps along the de-facto border with Pakistan in Kashmir. Surgical strike is a pre-emptive attack on a specific target with an aim to neutralize the enemy with minimum collateral damage. Pakistan denied the claim and replied it as a cross border firing. Prime Minister Mr. Modi announced earlier that the attack at the Uri army base, in which 18 soldiers had died, will not go unpunished. The Uri attack came at a time of deep crisis in India-Pakistan relations. India is still smarting from an earlier attack on a military base in India, in the town of Pathankot in Punjab state in January, which it also blamed on JeM-a group with close ties to Pakistani intelligence. The two countries have fought three major wars, but they all occurred before 1998, when both nations became declared nuclear weapons states. Pakistanis already accuse India of waging covert war in Pakistan, from colluding with the Pakistani Taliban to collaborating with Baloch separatists. A wave of attacks on Pakistani troops or an assassination campaign against terrorists—regardless of whether there is clear evidence of Indian complicity—could lead to Pakistan-sponsored terror attacks in India. The territorial dispute between the two countries has been running for over six decades, and two out of the three wars fought between the nuclear-armed rivals have been over Kashmir.

The UN has urged both countries to exercise restraint. Stephane Dujarric, UN spokesman said, “The UN Military Observer Group for India and Pakistan, UNMOGIP, is aware of the ceasefire violations and right now is liaising with the concerned authorities to obtain further information. The United Nations calls on the government of India and Pakistan to exercise restraint and encourage them to continue their efforts to resolve their differences peacefully and through dialogue."

There are lot of speculations over the water disputes between the neighbouring states. The water dispute between India and Pakistan is serious not only because of water, but also due to the political rivalry between the two countries. The IWT (Indus Water Treaty) is a 56-year-old accord that governs how India and Pakistan manage the vast Indus River Basin's rivers and tributaries. On Sept 26, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi told top officials present at the treaty review meeting that "blood and water cannot flow together."  If India were to annul the IWT, the consequences might well be humanitarian devastation in what is already one of the world's most water-starved countries - an outcome far more harmful and far-reaching than the effects of limited war. One of the main reasons the agreement was signed because India is the source of all the rivers of the Indus basin, although Indus and Sutlej originate in China. The rivers enabled India to use them for irrigation, transport and power generation. Pakistan also needed the water and feared that India could eventually create a drought situation in Pakistan in case a war breaks out between the two countries. Under the treaty, the waters of the three eastern rivers — Beas, Ravi and Sutlej — were granted to be used by India without restriction, while 80% of the three western rivers — Indus, Chenab and Jhelum were allocated to Pakistan. The Treaty of Indus remained intact even after three wars between India and Pakistan in 1962, 1971 and 1999. Revoking the treaty will add a new colour to the Kashmir solution and sensitise the circumstances.

India and Pakistan both are suffering because of the vested interest of their respective leaders. They don’t want to resolve the issue. Kashmir is one the biggest issues in Indian Pakistan history. There are four aspect of this issue. One Indian controlled Jammu and Kashmir, Second nobody talks about China occupied Kashmir and third is Azad Kashmir who don't want to live with Pakistani's and fourth is Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. If you directly want to jump to solution you will not be able to understand the real issue of Kashmir. There were several solutions proposed by both side India and Pakistan but most of the problem is regulation and trust with each others. From India point of view we already loose trust with Pakistan because of several border infiltration and militant attack not only in Jammu and Kashmir but also in Punjab.

Since last 70 years, India and Pakistan have been unable to resolve their differences and develop a normal good neighbourly relationship, which could have benefitted people on both sides of the border. Several measures have been taken for a peaceful living.  Both are standing still. Does it mean that the two countries are cursed to live in perpetual hostility? Can they overcome their historic rivalry and emulate the example of France and Germany after the World War II? The tensions between India and Pakistan are deeply rooted in their common history. Their failure to reconcile their differences ultimately resulted in the partition of the Sub-continent.
Soon after the partition in 1947 of the sub-continent into the two nations, about 17 million people fled their homes and journeyed to either Pakistan or India. In one of the largest exchanges of populations in history, violence soon broke out with Muslims on one side and Sikhs and Hindus on the other. The resulting bloodshed in the Punjab and West Bengal regions left more than one million people dead in its wake. In the midst of this refugee movement and open violence, the governments of India and Pakistan hastily tried to divide the assets of British India between the two new countries. From weapons and money, down to paper clips and archaeological treasures all had to be divided.

Not only did the architects of Indian foreign policy fear Pakistan, but in 1962, after China's sudden invasion of northeast India, they suddenly realized the ancient protection of the Himalayan Mountains had vanished. Soon after the China war of 1962, Indian scientists began developing its nuclear capability. Under Indira Gandhi's Prime Ministership in 1974, India successfully exploded a nuclear device, announcing to the world its scientific capacity to develop nuclear bombs. China is the premier military power in Asia and considers Pakistan its oldest and most powerful Asian ally. China continues to occupy areas inside of India's borders as a result of the Indo-China war of 1962. China has nuclear-armed missiles positioned against India along the Himalayan border and in Tibet, in addition to being Pakistan’s main military weapons provider. Russia has had close relations with India since Indira Gandhi became prime minister in 1966. Russia provides most of India's military sales. After the demise of the Soviet Empire, Russia is unable to provide economic or military aid to India.

There is an erroneous thinking that has gone on for a very long time in India. Pakistan has used “non state actors” for as long as its existence to further its “doctrine”. It started in 1947 when it sent tribal force into Kashmir to seize control illegally and has used it ever since in its pursuit to get even with India. Soon after independence, Pakistan started its pursuit to project itself as the fort of Islam when it invaded Kashmir, a princely state which acceded to India based on the terms of independence of India, because it had Muslim majority population. It is often projected that Pakistan started using terrorists against India from late 1980s but the fact is that it was right after independence that Pakistan sent tribal force into Kashmir to snatch control. Pakistan will not desist from anti India activities even if it is given Kashmir on a platter by India as it is in an ideological battle with India.

Indo-Pak has the same historical-cum-cultural patterns, the “Indian cultural” pattern that has developed in a context ranging for more than a thousand years. There are great stories of peaceful coexistence and harmony during this vast historical span. The same can be revived today in this evolved context. Regardless of our differences, we are all human beings who are also entitled to a just and dignified life, a promise of the state. It is time to find effective solutions to strengthening Indo-Pak relationships. It is time to end our indifferences and forge a ‘United We Stand’ conversation about our mutual development and unity.

By – Siddhartha Shankar Mishra

( Author is a Lawyer and a Writer ) 

November 23, 2016

The Nation In Queue





India In Queue

The nation is stuck somewhere. The demonetization is a major jolt on the entire fabric of the nation. Prime Minister Narendra Modi opined, “Demonetization is a dose aimed at improving health of India’s economy.” First what is demonetization? It is an act of stripping a currency unit of its status as a legal tender. Demonetization is necessary whenever there is a change of national currency. The old unit of currency must be retired and replaced with a new currency unit.

The fact about India’s demonetization of Rs 500 and Rs 1000 that 85% of all currency in circulation has just been turned into coupons that can only be exchanged in specific places. These notes can be converted into currency again only with identity proofs (millions don’t have) and the additional hardship of standing in many queues for many hours. Over half of India’s population doesn’t have any sort of bank account at the moment and about 300 million don’t have basic ID such as Aadhaar either and hence, cannot access the banking system at all. About 110 million Indians have mobile wallets (about 30 million have credit cards) and there are maybe 510-600 million debit cards in circulation. So access to cash is very, very important for average Indians. India is a cash economy. And 90% of all transactions are done in cash. Controlling corruption is not about blocking access to a non-traceable store of value. Breaking the problem of corruption requires deeper changes to institutions.

Demonetization is not a new phenomenon. It has happened in 12 Jan 1946 and 16 Jan 1978 too. It is the third one on 8 Nov 2016. During 1946, pre-independence period The Governor agreed that about 50 per cent of the notes would be in the Indian States and so co-operation of the State Governments was very necessary. Apparently he had some doubts about this. The ideal thing was to block high denomination notes, but this course was not favoured by either the Finance Member or the Governor. This is strange if one looks at it. In 1946, the idea was to demon but it became more of a conversion. In 2016, we are calling it demon but it is actually conversion. However, lesser the conversion, it but could become demon. Talk about going in circles with words.
Second happened in 16 Jan 1978. That time the Finance Minister H.M. Patel in his budget speech on 28 Feb 1978 said:
The demonetisation of high denomination bank notes was a step primarily aimed at controlling illegal transactions. It is a part of a series of measures which Government has taken and is determined to take against anti-social elements. “As the then Finance Minister did not say anything about the success of the exercise, one can almost guess that it did not create much impact like in 1946.

India’s total tangible wealth is of the order of 280 lakh crores. World bank estimates at least a quarter of this is black. That means 70 lakh crores. It is possible that 10% of it is in cash, with the rest in real estate and gold. That is 7 lakh crores of black cash that is lying around. Maybe 80% of it will turn white and even with that Rs 1.4 lakh crores of black will be gone. That is big. Indira Gandhi tried this in early 1970s, but could not as the move leaked out and the bad guys quickly changed over the notes. The government had to back out of the move then. I’m even thinking if the move to ban NDTV was just a ploy to distract the whole media, to pull this off. And it was possibly scheduled on US election day likely to get the global media off the heat and attention, as foreign media has been ultra critical & condescending of any major move in India.

Nearly 40 percent of India's economy is driven by small- and medium-sized enterprises that largely run on cash transactions. This move could impact these businesses, and in turn have a knock-on effect on economic growth. Not known, how many are paying full income tax. The tax evaders better start paying tax rather than consider the unpaid tax is part of their profit. These people pollute the society of good Indian citizens. For the poor who don’t have debit/credit cards, there might not be much impact either - as most of their transaction happen under Rs. 500. Cashless economy in India , which is having a rural economy is immature stance of Mr Arun Jaitley. “Corruption, counterfeiting, terrorism funding, cashless economy, gold/silver, real estate, it will have an huge impact because of demonetisation.” – Arun jaitley said in a media conference.

We all know how to buy a house in India, 30% in cash and rest in white money. How do you get your work done around babus, just hand over a RS 500 note, smooth? Election money - cash, tax-free gold - cash, religious places - cash, marriage gifts - cash. That is all the money that government knows nothing about. I am sure not all the black money would be gone with a single stroke just as Raghuram Rajan mentioned, smart people will find a way. But they would certainly be more cautious from now on. For the general public, it would induce fear of stashing more cash at home that too if it is black. At least by 20-30%, because at the end of the day no matter how smart you are and what other ways you chose you would have to go to back to change the old currency to new, or deposit it in banks. Raghuram Rajan was aware of this process all along, and this was not a surprise for him. Of Course without blowing their own trumpet as “surgical strike on black money “ , which will deliver them great votes or boomerang on them , but if the present govt focused properly ,this would be an effective step to somewhat alleviate many of the problems in the economy. Further he added, “This is not an attempt to demonetise. It is an attempt to replace less effective notes with more effective notes. I understand people are making different interpretations. Unfortunately that should not be the interpretation."

BJP is the largest party in majority in India. There are several state level and district level leaders who would be holding black money. This move actually would hurt the party themselves in the states. Moreover, there would be a lot of supporters and benefactors of BJP that would be dealing in black money. It takes a great of guts and willpower to actually do this. Most of the erstwhile govts could not do this for this very reason. Indira gandhi tried but the information got leaked, probably when they tried to safeguard their own party and supporters before the move was publicly announced. This time however, Modi did not take into consideration the implication on his party and his benefactors in the interest of the country. In February 2015, Indian Express released the list of 1195 Indians account holders and their balances for the year 2006-07 in HSBC's Geneva branch. The list was obtained by French newspaper Le Monde and included the names of several prominent businessmen, diamond traders and politicians. The Swiss Ministry of External Affairs has confirmed these figures upon request for information by the Indian Ministry of External Affairs. 

Demonetization always has had an elephantine jolt on parallel economies. This is the sizable spank on the Indian parallel economy, yet. This could easily eclipse all voluntary disclosure schemes offers by current and past governments. How substantial the bang, time will tell. We can only muse.

By – Siddhartha Shankar Mishra
( Lawyer and a Writer )